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Articles 
Custody and Contradictions: 
Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family 
Law in the Context of Child Custody 
DAVID B. THRONSON* 
The Border Patrol arrested and processed for repatrzatwn an 
undocumented father who was detained along with his U.S. citizen 
daughter who was in his care.' As the moment of repatriation approached, 
the daughter's U.S. citizen mother appeared at the Border Patrol station 
and demanded the child. 2 In the absence of a state court order awarding 
her custody, the Border Patrol refused to turn over the child to the 
mother. 3 Later that day the child accompanied her father as he was 
removed to Mexico, where she remained for three years. 4 In subsequent 
litigation regarding this matter, the U.S. government asserted that it had 
"no policies, rules or statutes governing the apprehension and detention of 
a foreign national [exercising] lawful custody of his or her U.S. juvenile 
child. "5 
In a contested child custody proceeding regarding undocumented 
children, a state family court judge noted that the mother "is in this country 
illegally. There's no way around that. "6 Ordering primary physical custody 
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las 
Vegas; J.D., Harvard Law School 1994. I would like to thank Veronica Thronson for her insights and 
support in preparing this article. 
1. See Castro v. United States, No. C-o6-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 
2007). 
2. See id. 
3· See id. at *9-10. 
4· /d. at *10-1 1. 
5· /d. at *26 n.1 1. 
6. Transcript of Record at 3, Rodriguez v. Rico (Nev. Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. Oct. 15, 2003) 
(No. D303041) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). 
[453] 
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of the undocumented children to their permanent resident father, the court 
declared that: 
One of the Court's reasons and rationale and logic behind its decision is 
the fact-and neither counsel seem to disagree on that and, if anything, 
they agreed [that] the designation of [father] as primary shortens the 
immigration time [for the children] by as much as five years, if that was 
my understanding. So that was tantamount in the Court's decision. 7 
In actuality, the agreed upon immigration analysis was nonsense, such that 
a reviewing court found that "the district court improperly considered [the 
father's] erroneous explanation of a repealed immigration statute. "8 
INTRODUCTION 
Without analysis or rationale, federal decisions enforcing 
immigration law routinely function as child custody determinations and 
immigration issues prove influential or even determinative in state court 
rulings on child custody. The custody of many children and the 
composition of many families are profoundly influenced by the 
unexamined convergence of immigration and family laws. Demographic 
trends indicate these will not be isolated events and the need for deep 
examination of the intersection of family law and immigration law is 
growing precipitously. 
As the number of immigrants and children of immigrants in the 
United States grows/ it is increasingly common to find "mixed-status" 
families in which all family members do not share a single immigration or 
citizenship status."' Today, one of every ten children now lives in a 
mixed-status family." Millions of children in mixed-status families are 
themselves U.S. citizens living with parents who are not, and, in a portion 
of these families, with parents who are not authorized to remain in the 
United States." At the same time, approximately r.8 million children live 
7· /d. a(4. 
8. Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 814 (Nev. 2005) (upholding disposition of the case on 
unrelated grounds). 
9· One in five children in the United States lives in an immigrant family, i.e. a family in which 
one or more parent is an immigrant. See FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY 
STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 58 (2002), available at 
http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2002/ac_o2.pdf. 
10. In fact, 85% of families with children and headed by a noncitizen are mixed-status families. 
See MICHAEL E. FIX ET AL., IMMIGRATION STUDIES: THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 15 (2001), available at http:// www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_integration.pdf. 
I I. /d. 
12. More than three million U.S. citizen children in the United States live in approximately two 
million families where at least one parent is not authorized to remain in the country. See JEFFREY S. 
PASSEL. THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 8 
( 2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6r.pdf. 
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in the United States without authorization, including some 
undocumented children whose parents have legal immigration status or 
U.S. citizenship.13 Among various combinations of immigration and 
citizenship status that make up this country's families, one is particularly 
widespread: in 41% of mixed-status families, parents have different 
citizenship statuses. 14 Differences in immigration status within families 
and between parents can create difficulties in the best of times, but they 
present special challenges when families break apart. 
When parents in a child custody dispute do not share the same 
immigration or citizenship status, it is not unusual for the parent holding 
a status perceived as superior to attempt to highlight the status of the 
other. 15 While parties and courts often reflexively assume there is legal 
significance or advantage in the distinction, the logic of this presumed 
relevance rarely is explained. Arguments by attorneys and pro se 
litigants alike feature a troubling prevalence of innuendo and outright 
bigotry. 
Yet at other times, parties without legal immigration status seek to 
raise concerns related to immigration concerns in family courts, asking 
courts to accommodate realities related to their situations or to tailor 
decisions to facilitate desired immigration outcomes. Because 
immigration status is an influential force that shapes the life experiences 
of many immigrants and immigrant families, the immigration status of 
parents and children forms an understandably tempting area of inquiry 
for family judges struggling to make difficult determinations about the 
interests of children on the basis of family law's vague and indeterminate 
criteria. 
Only a handful of courts have published opinions that formally 
endorse the consideration of immigration status in making child custody 
determinations. 16 These decisions rely on conclusory statements 
13. !d. Children constitute 16% of the unauthorized migrant population in the United States. See 
id.; see also Javier C. Hernandez, Tiny Deportee? Girl, 5, Faces Immigration Hearing That Could 
Separate Her from Her Family If She Is Ordered to Return to £1 Salvador, BosTON GLOBE, July 7, 2007, 
at 81, available at http://www.boston.com/news!localfarticles/2oo7/07/o7/tiny_deportee. 
14· Valerie Leiter et al., Challenges to Children's Independent Citizenship: Immigration, Family, 
and the State, 13 CHILDHOOD I I, I7 (2006). 
IS. See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of 
Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts. I I TEx. HrsP. J.L. & PoL'Y 45.53 (2005). 
I6. See, e.g .. In re Cardosa Vidal, No. 6-497/os-I75I. 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 1286. at *9 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Nov. I6, 2006) (noting that "the district court indicated Ana's undocumented status 'complicates 
the custody issue'"); Rico v. Rodriguez, I20 P.3d 812.818-19 (Nev. 2005) ("(T]he district court has the 
discretion to consider a parent's immigration status to determine its derivative effects on the 
children."); Florentino v. Woods (In re parentage of Florentino). No. 25966-4-II. 2002 Wash. App. 
LEXIS I896, at *19 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002) ("[T]he trial court has the discretion to consider the 
undocumented status of a parent as a factor in the overall determination of the best interest of the 
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regarding the permissibility of inquiries into immigration status and 
provide little guidance as to the motivations and parameters of such 
consideration. The impulse to consider immigration status in many cases 
is dubious at best. '7 Other courts have incorporated immigration status 
considerations into decisions without open acknowledgement or 
comment, leaving room to wonder if the court has acted from unstated 
bias or misinformation. Regardless of the motivation for the 
consideration of immigration issues in child custody matters, its 
execution by family court judges unversed in immigration law can be 
misdirected and mistaken.'8 In short, courts have demonstrated 
willingness to consider immigration status issues in child custody disputes 
but have yet to articulate a rationale for whether this engagement is 
proper and to develop a workable framework for competent analysis if it 
is. 
One reason this interrelationship has not received more attention is 
that immigration law and family law traditionally are viewed as extreme 
opposites on the spectrum of state and federal power. In the common 
understanding of the allocation of power between state and federal 
courts, it is routine to acknowledge the plenary nature of federal 
authority regarding matters of immigration.'9 Likewise, the primacy of 
the states in matters of family law has long been accepted.2° Federal 
courts have long been quick to invoke the "domestic relations exception" 
that "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and 
child custody decrees. "21 Touting this division, the Supreme Court 
declared that the states "possess 'special proficiency' in the field of 
child."). 
I7- See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 83 I (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting the trial judge as stating that 
he had a "problem" with father's immigration status). 
I8. See e.g., Rico, I20 P.3d at 814 (noting that trial court accepted "erroneous explanation of a 
repealed immigration statute"). 
I9- See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 53I (I953) ("[T]hat the formulation of [policies pertaining 
to the entry of noncitizens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively to Congress has 
become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any 
aspect of our government."); see also Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (I972) ("[P]lenary 
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly 
established."). 
20. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, I2 (2004) ("One of the principal areas in 
which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we 
observed that '[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."' (quoting In re Burrus, 136 
U.S. 586,593 (I89o))). 
21. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also In re Burrus, I36 U.S. at 596 
("[T]he relations of the father and child are not matters governed by the laws of the United 
States .... "). 
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domestic relations, including child custody."22 
But simply repeating the mantra that federal law does not 
encompass family law does not make it so. In a number of areas, there is 
increasing recognition "that the axiom that family law belongs 
exclusively within the state domain is both empirically untrue and 
theoretically unsound."23 As they regulate family relationships and 
determine rights between family members, "federal social security law, 
employee benefit law, immigration law, tax law, Indian law, military law, 
same-sex marriage law, child support law, adoption law, and family 
violence and abuse law are also forms of family law."24 Scholarly 
exploratiOn of the ways in which federal law operates as family law is 
emerging in a number of contextS.25 In the context of immigration, recent 
scholarship demonstrates the manner in which immigration law functions 
as family law in the regulation of marriage.26 An analysis of immigration 
law as family law in the context of child custody is overdue. 
In earlier writing, I identified patterns in the responses of family 
courts when immigration status issues arise across a broad spectrum of 
issues in family law27 and examined the tensions between children's and 
parents' rights in situations where immigration law reaches differing 
conclusions about the legal rights of parents and children to remain in 
the United States.28 To date, very little attention has been directed at the 
use of immigration status in family court generally, and even less toward 
the prevalent context of child custody determinations.29 In this Article, I 
22. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1993) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704); see also 
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 26o (3d Cir. 2005) ("These are all matters of state law, as no federal 
courts or statutes grant child custody."); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, 
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1746 n.337 (1991) (describing line of 
federal cases disclaiming power over child custody). 
23. Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 255 (1999); see also 
Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention 
of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1761, 1814 (2005). 
24. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825, 875 (2004). 
25. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RAcE & 
JusT. 267, 267-68 (2002) (describing federal tax law's impact on dependent children in non-traditional 
families); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the 
Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1647 (2005) (exploring federal welfare law's 
promotion of marriage). 
26. See generally Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. 
REv. r625 (2007); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
105 COLUM. L. REv. 641 (2005). 
27. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 45· 
28. See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 
NEV. L.J. II65. II8\)-1213 (2006). 
29. See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 14 VA. J. 
Soc. PoL'Y & L. 87, 87-89 (2006). In fact, most scholarship related to children and immigration 
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seek to explore in depth this area that has received only limited scholarly 
focus. 
Part I of this Article evaluates, from a family law perspective, the 
propriety of immigration status considerations in the determination of 
child custody. It cautions that consideration of immigration status per se 
is discriminatory and irrelevant to the best interests of the child, yet 
rejects a bright line prohibition on raising immigration concerns in child 
custody matters in light of the persistent and pervasive collateral impact 
of immigration status on some children and families. In suggesting 
parameters for the cautious evaluation of immigration related matters on 
a case-by-case basis, the analysis is attuned to the ways in which 
immigration status influences the lives of many immigrants and 
immigrant families in a variety of predictable and unpredictable ways. In 
particular, it considers the frequent contention that the determination of 
child custody itself will play a critical role in the child's own immigration 
or nationality status. 
With evaluation of this potential interplay of child custody and a 
child's immigration status in mind, Part II of the Article turns to 
immigration law. Only with an understanding of the actual impact of a 
child custody determination in immigration law is it possible to evaluate 
truly how immigration law might impact the best interests of the child in 
a child custody dispute. This section therefore undertakes a deep analysis 
of the erratic and unprincipled role of child custody in immigration and 
nationality law. It examines how the interrelated immigration and 
nationality laws exhibit a remarkable lack of consistency in the import of 
child custody and reveals a haphazard and capricious framework that 
devalues children. 
Part III builds on the preceding family law and immigration law 
analyses by exploring the notion of immigration law as family law and 
family law as immigration law. Looking at immigration law as family law 
provides a critical perspective to review its treatment of children and 
child custody. Likewise, critiquing the manner in which family law can 
function as immigration law provides fresh insights regarding the 
addresses the plight of unaccompanied minors. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes": 
Moving and Removing Children Across Borders, I5 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. I97. 205 (2006); Jacqueline 
Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the 
New U.S. Guidelines, II INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84 (I999); Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, £/ian or Alien? The 
Contradictions of Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 
HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 597, 6oo (2ooo); Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented 
Immigrant Children from Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 
Amendments to the SIJ Law, I5 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 237 (2006); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children 
Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 
I5 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 2I9 (2006). 
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appropriate parameters for the consideration of immigration-related 
issues in child custody matters. This analysis provides unique 
perspectives from which to explore the significant tensions, and 
occasional common ground, between the conflicting values and 
contradictory policies of immigration law and family law. 
I. CoNSIDERING IMMIGRATION STATus IN CHILD CusTODY 
DETERMINATIONS-MAINTAINING THE CENTRALITY OF CHILDREN'S 
INTERESTS 
Almost universally, "nations are guided by the precept that the 
primary consideration underlying any [child] custody decision must be 
the best interests of the child."3° Certainly, in the domestic context the 
"custody law in every state in the United States ... embraces the 'best 
interests' standard."3' Courts emphasize that 
custody determinations subordinate a parent's interests and allocate 
custody according to a determination of the best interests of the child, 
that the welfare of the child is the determining factor in establishing 
child custody, that whatever claim parents may make for either custody 
or visitation rights, is to be tested by what is in the best interest of the 
child.3' 
This approach places children and their interests at the center of the 
matter.33 
Still, "best interests" can take on many meanings. Some states make 
no statutory attempt to clarify its meaning while others provide specific 
criteria or guidelines for determining a child's best interest.34 Across the 
board, however, family courts characteristically exercise tremendous 
latitude in the application of this expansive standard.35 As one court put 
30. D. Marianne Blair & Merle H. Weiner, Resolving Parental Custody Disputes-A Comparative 
Exploration, 39 FAM. L.Q. 247,247 (2005). 
31. /d. 
32. Hasday, supra note 24, at 849 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
33· See generally Mary Ann Mason, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE 
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES I (1994). 
34· See Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 5, 16 (2002). 
35· See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Alaska 1979) ("A court's task in a child custody 
case is to determine which parent will better serve the best interests of the child. Myriad factors may 
be considered in working toward this goal. To hold that a court may not consider religious factors 
under any circumstances would blind courts to important elements bearing on the best interests of the 
child. The constitution is not so inflexible as to foreclose all inquiry into this sensitive area."); Linda D. 
Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Parentage and Assisted Reproduction 
Problems Take Center Stage, 39 FAM. L.Q., 879,894 (2006) ("Louisiana finds that the trial court is not 
bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all statutory factors or to give more weight to one factor 
over another; the factors are not exclusive." (citing In re Ricard, go6 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 2005))); 
Robert D. Zalsow, Child Custody, Visitation, and the HIV Virus: Revisiting the Best Interests Doctrine 
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it: "The family court 'may draw upon its own common sense and 
experience in reaching a reasoned judgment' as to the best interests of 
the child."36 This equitable flexibility in the exercise of broadly stated 
mandates stands in stark contrast to the unyielding application of a rigid 
statutory framework in immigration law. 
The flexibility of family court judges may be near its zenith in the 
context of child custody disputes between parents. While parents have 
interests of constitutional dimension in their relationships with their 
children that limit the state's ability to intervene in families/7 in disputes 
between parents it is not unusual for judges to interpret the presence of 
strong constitutional interests on the part of both parents as license to 
exercise particularly unfettered discretion. As one court articulated its 
reasoning, where "both parents seek custody, each parent proceeds in 
possession, so to speak, of a constitutionally-protected fundamental 
parental right. Neither parent has a superior claim to the exercise of this 
right to provide care, custody, and control of the children."38 In this view, 
"each fit parent's constitutional right neutralizes the other parent's 
constitutional right, leaving, generally, the best interests of the child as 
the sole standard to apply to these types of custody decisions."39 
It is precisely in such custody disputes, with the perceived absence of 
a confining structure of constitutional interests, that family courts are 
most prone to grasp at imagined and real distinctions between parents, 
including distinctions related to the immigration status of parents and 
children. Whether this practice of permitting the broad reach of the 
family court to include immigration status is appropriate turns in large 
part on the purpose for which immigration status is considered and how 
to Ensure Impartial Parental Rights Determinations for HIV-Infected Parents, 3 J. PHARMACY & L. 61,68 
(1994) ("Whether or not a particular jurisdiction has statutory guidelines upon which to determine a 
child's best interests, all custody and visitation laws ... grant judges tremendous leeway to formulate a 
decree as he/she may see fit."). 
36. Osmanagic v. Osmanagic, 872 A.2d 897, 899 (Vt. 2005) (quoting Payrits v. Payrits, 757 A.2d 
469,472 (2000)). 
37· See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding that it is "cardinal ... that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents"). In fact, "the interest of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized" by the Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65 (2000). 
38. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39· /d. (emphasis omitted); see also Baker v. Baker, 682 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) 
("Since both parents have a 'right' to custody, those conflicting rights cancel each other out, and the 
best interest of the child is determinative."); Peterson v. Ransome, 8 Phila. Cty. Rptr. 461, 490-91 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) ("In approaching the delicate question of child custody, the burden of proof 
between natural parents is generally equal. ... Given the equal standing of the parties, our analysis 
shifts to the standard for determining custody matters. The polestar in deciding all custody and 
visitation cases is the best interests and welfare of the child." (citation omitted)). 
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it is utilized. 
Several years ago, I conducted a systemic review of family court 
decisions and described four approaches that family courts adopt when 
considering immigration related issues.40 These patterns emerged across a 
range of underlying family law issues and bridged jurisdictiom.4' The first 
approach is explicit discrimination, where courts and parties openly 
indicate bias or where outcomes turn on immigration status per se.42 
Second, and closely related, some family courts less convinced of the 
propriety consideration of immigration status adopt the approach of 
obfuscation.43 In such instances, courts articulate reasons purportedly 
unrelated to immigration status in reaching decisions, but in actuality 
their rationales are a pretext for immigration status considerations.44 
Third, many courts choose or feel forced into accommodation, 
responding to the unavoidable collateral consequences and challenges 
that sometimes accompany a party's immigration status.45 Finally some 
courts employ a utilitarian approach of manipulation, or tailoring family 
court outcomes in an effort to facilitate particular immigration 
outcomes.46 
Mapping the possible use of immigration considerations in child 
custody matters onto this framework proves a useful method to evaluate 
the appropriateness of such consideration. 
A. DISCRIMINATION AND OBFUSCATION-RESISTING A SHIFf AWAY FROM 
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS 
Immigrants are routinely fearful that their immigration status will 
result in unfair treatment in child custody proceedings. The notion that 
the flexibility of the best interests of the child standard can become a 
vehicle for discrimination is not unique to immigrants and is shared by 
parents and children from a variety of vulnerable populations.47 As anti-
40. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 53· 
41. !d. 
42. !d. at 54--00. 
43· !d. at 64-68. 
44· !d. 
45· !d. at 68--71. 
46. !d. at 6o-64. 
47· See, e.g .. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and 
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 6oS (1997) (discussing how the best interest 
standard's subjectivity and indeterminacy disproportionately impacts poor families and families of 
color); Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay 
and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 253, 318 (1998) (discussing criticism that the best interests 
standard "can mask all manner of biases, views, political interest, misconceptions, and ... plain 
ignorance" (quoting Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases, 33 FAM. & 
CoNCILIATION Cis. REv. 361, 362 (1995))); Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody 
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immigrant ordinances and failed attempts at comprehensive immigration 
reform make headlines, a strong societal narrative that immigrants are 
undeserving and unworthy prevails.48 Indeed, loud voices call expressly 
for worse treatment of immigrants in their daily interactions with the 
world, spouting a cynical and farfetched belief that rather than reforming 
or enforcing immigration law, the United States can induce mass self-
deportation by imposing misery on immigrant families. 49 In mixed-status 
families, the societal marginalization of unauthorized immigrants has 
serious spillover repercussions for other family members, without regard 
to their individual immigration or citizenship status.5° Concerns of 
judicial bias are exacerbated by unrestrained calls for outright 
discrimination from opposing parties in child custody matters. Given this 
pervasive social narrative and the reality of formal and informal 
marginalization, it is not surpnsmg that discrimination against 
immigrants in the courtroom is widely anticipated. 
Some courts confirm these fears by openly expressing discrimination 
on the basis of immigration status5' or through more subtle or 
unconscious bias against immigrants.52 The struggles of immigrants in 
Speech Restrictions, 8r N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 656 (2oo6) (discussing vagueness of best interests of the 
child standard in context of the First Amendment and unpopular speech); Zalsow, supra note 35, at 68 
(discussing "fear that judges may abuse the tremendous leeway to sculpt custody determinations in 
line with their personal views, idiosyncrasies, and prejudices"). 
48. See, e.g., BILL 0NG HING, DEPORTING OuR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION 
PoLICY 2 (2oo6) ("Unfortunately, the heartless side of U.S. immigration policy is on full display today; 
anti-immigrant fervor has been quite effective of late .... The anti-immigrant movement in the United 
States is as strong as ever. Immigrant bashing is popular among politicians, talk radio hosts, private 
militiamen, and xenophobic grassroots organizations."). 
49· See, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Immigration Problem Needs an Attrition Policy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 28, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/viewpoints/articles/o8z8krikoriano8z8online. 
html ("This would involve both conventional measures, like arresting and deporting more illegals. But 
an attrition strategy would also involve other measures-firewalls, you might say-to make it as 
difficult as possible for illegal aliens to live a normal life here. This would entice fewer to come in the 
first place and persuade millions who are already here to give up and deport themselves .... Over a 
period of several years, such an attrition strategy would serve to shrink the illegal population to a 
manageable nuisance .... "). 
50. See MICHAEL E. FIX & WENDY ZIMMERMAN, ALL UNDER ONE RooF: MIXED-STATUS FAMILIES 
IN AN ERA OF REFORM 2 (1999); Randy Capps et al., A Profile of Low-Income Working Immigrant 
Families, in NEW fEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, at 2 (The Urban lnst. Series 
B., No. B-67, 2005); David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-
Centered Immigration Law, '4 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. s8, 77-SO (2oo6). 
51. Cf Leslye Orloff et a!., Countering Abuser's Attempts to Raise Immigration Status of the 
Victim in Custody Cases, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 
FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS ch. 6.1, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/ 
DocServer/counteringabuserattempts.pdf?doclD=289 ("Some judges may have strong negative 
feelings about immigrants that will greatly influence their decision-making."). 
52. Thronson, supra note 15, at 67 ("Family courts routinely set conditions that parties must meet 
before the court makes decisions regarding child custody. . . . Occasionally, however, courts 
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high profile cases can reinforce fears and expectations of bias.53 
Unfortunately, the flexibility afforded judges under the best interests 
standard '"mask[ s] all manner of biases, views, political interest, 
misconceptions and, indeed, plain ignorance.'"54 
Concerns regarding discrimination through the introduction of 
immigration status in child custody matters have been raised most 
prominently in the context of domestic violence. Domestic violence 
advocates are acutely attuned to the issue because misinformation about 
the role of immigration status in determining child custody usually begins 
long before a court comes into the picture. Abusers can use "control over 
immigration status to stop their spouses from reporting or fleeing from 
the abuse ... by threatening deportation and loss of ability to work and 
loss of child custody because of deportation."55 More pointedly, abusers 
often convince victims that child custody proceedings would disfavor 
parents without immigration authorization: 
Fear of losing custody of or access to children is a significant factor that 
keeps battered women from leaving their abusers or seeking help to 
stop the abuse. This fear is substantiated by the fact that, in many child 
custody cases, abusers of immigrant victims raise the issue of the 
victims' lack of legal immigration status in order to tip the custody 
scales in their favor. Abusers use child custody litigation as a vehicle to 
maintain control over the victims. 56 
illegitimately use this routine device to mask the impact of immigration status on decisions by 
attaching consequences to conditions that are based on wildly inaccurate assumptions about 
immigration law and are impossible to meet."). 
53· See Woody Baird, Girl, 8, Back with Chinese Parents. USA ToDAY, July 23, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2o07-07-23-27I46oi73-X.htm ("A Chinese couple regained 
legal custody of their 8-year-old daughter Monday after a seven-year fight to get her back from what 
was supposed to by temporary foster care."). 
54· Ball & Pea, supra note 47, (quoting Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for 
Custody Cases, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATIONS CTS. REV. 36I, 362 (I995)). 
55· Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment, but 
Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL U. L. REv. I53, I67-68 (2004); see also ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 6 
("Threatening an immigrant victim that the police will turn her into USCIS if she calls the police for 
help isolates the immigrant victim and her children from police and justice system protection and 
shields the abuser from prosecution for his violence."); Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking 
Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REv. 665, 68o (1998) 
("Abusive husbands routinely threaten to call INS and report their undocumented wives if there is any 
attempt to report the beatings."). 
56. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 2 (footnotes omitted); see also Felicia E. Franco, 
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women. I I BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 99, 136 (I996): 
Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of Conversations with 
Battered Undocumented Women, I9 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. I38, I82 (2004) (describing interviews 
with undocumented women in which they "all regarded the courts and the custody laws as adversarial 
to their interests .... The women shared an overriding sense of their own vulnerability in the legal 
setting"). 
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The stakes in child custody disputes are high and misinformation, 
distrust, and fear of discrimination persist, despite immigration law 
reforms that ameliorate aspects of an abuser's control in the immigration 
system.57 Indeed, "48.2% of battered immigrant women who reported 
still living in an abusive relationship cited the fear of losing child custody 
as an obstacle to leaving that relationship."58 This means that "many 
battered immigrant mothers are reluctant to pursue a civil order of 
protection, divorce, custody, or child support proceeding .... Since their 
mothers are legally incapacitated, these children lose their natural 
advocates. "59 In this milieu, even before arriving in court, fear of 
discrimination in the determination of child custody creates a strong 
barrier to battered women and children accessing the justice system. 
In response to this situation, advocates for immigrant domestic 
violence victims have long advanced strong opposition to the 
consideration of immigration status in child custody disputes. One 
American Bar Association publication flatly concluded that "parties 
should not be able to raise, and courts should not consider, immigration 
status of domestic violence victims and their children in civil protection 
order, custody, divorce or child support proceedings."()() Such a bright line 
articulation is a lucid reaction to the familiar misuse of immigration 
status by abusers. 
Of course, the reason to resist the introduction of immigration status 
considerations in child custody matters cannot be that the feared 
discriminatory use of immigration status is appropriate and has merit. 
Implicit in the desire of abusers to raise immigration status issues is the 
57· See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § II54(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2ooo) (detailing provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act under which spouses and children who have been battered or subjected to 
extreme cruelty may qualify to "self-petition"); see also id. § IIOI(a)(15)(U) (2000) (providing the 
possibility of visas to those who suffer substantial physical and mental abuse as the result of certain 
crimes). Moreover, 
in no case may the Attorney General, or any other official or employee of the 
[government] ... make an adverse determination of admissibility or deportability of an 
alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act using information furnished solely by ... a 
spouse or parent who has battered the alien or subjected the alien to extreme cruelty. 
!d. § 136'](a)(1)(A) (2000). 
58. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 7; accord Franco, supra note 56, at 135-36 (concluding that 
"[m]any immigrant women remain in physically and/or psychologically abusive relationships because 
they fear that leaving their husbands will mean losing their children"). 
59· Franco, supra note 56, at 137. 
6o. HOWARD DAVIDSON, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON 
CHILDREN, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 20 (1994); accord ORLOFF 
ET AL., supra note 51, at 5 (noting that a "non-abusive parent's immigration status should not be raised 
nor should it be considered pertinent in custody, protection order, divorce, or other family law 
proceedings"). 
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"claim[] that it is better for children to live with an abusive person rather 
than with a non-abusive parent who may lack legal immigration status or 
permanent legal immigration status."6 ' Even in the absence of domestic 
violence, those seeking to introduce immigration status into child custody 
proceedings often expect that some real or perceived difference in 
immigration status, standing alone, can and should provide advantage in the 
indeterminate child custody calculus.6' There often may be good reason to 
confront parties and courts that openly or tacitly accept this premise. 
Complete avoidance of the issue of immigration status in family 
court may allow the persistence of the misinformation and fear that 
keeps immigrants away from courts designed to protect their interests. 
Parties are certain to ask courts to discriminate, and in a world where 
immigrants and those around them are uncertain of their rights, it is 
worth articulating reasons that discrimination based on immigration 
status must be rejected. At times, open engagement on the merits is the 
best way to keep a court from obfuscating its unexamined discriminatory 
assumptions and conclusions. 
Though "nobody argues that aliens are treated identically with 
citizens in every circumstance,"63 popular conceptions that parents 
without authorized immigration status have lesser interests in the parent-
child relationship64 are simply false. The rare courts that have actually 
commented on whether immigration status per se might validly impact 
child custody have rejected the notion, tersely yet unequivocally. 
Dismissing in a footnote the argument that a father "should be denied 
custody solely because of his immigration status," an appellate court in 
Washington observed that "[t]he due process and equal protection 
provisions prevent denying an illegal immigrant custody based on that 
ground."65 Persons who knowingly "enter this country without legal 
61. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 5· 
62. See, e.g., Florentino v. Woods (In re parentage of Florentino), No. 25966-4-II, 2002 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 1896, at *17 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002) (noting that in appeal mother assigned error 
to the trial court's "failure to in any way consider the fact that the Respondent father is not a U.S. 
citizen and is not a legal permanent resident of the United States"). 
63. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1047, 1063 (1994). In the United States, the law is "deeply divided about the significance of the 
status of alienage for the allocation of rights and benefits in our society." /d. at 1055· 
64. See John Brummett, Can't We All Meet at the Southern Border?, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2oo6, http://www.pahrumpvalleytimes.comf2oo6/o3i3Iiopinionlbrummett.html ("We'll put the 
illegal parents in the van bound for Mexico and the American kids in the van bound for the social 
services agencies."). 
65. Florentino, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS r8g6, at *r8 n.I r; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,210 
(rg82) (recognizing that "even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been 
recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"); 
Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1985) ("(P)arents have a fundamental liberty 
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authorization are not stripped immediately of all their rights because of 
this single illegal act. "66 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that 
among the "fundamental interests [that] apply to individuals regardless 
of their immigration status" is "the interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children."67 As such, without regard to their 
immigration status, parents stand "on equal footing ... when asserting 
their right to custody of their children. "68 
Certainly trepidation about and vigilance for discrimination in child 
custody disputes on the basis of immigration status is prudent, but 
hesitation to inject immigration status issues must never arise from any 
sense of ambiguity that a parent or child's rights regarding custody might 
be diminished merely on the basis of their immigration status.69 A 
parent's immigration or citizenship status per se is irrelevant to the 
determination of a child's best interests because it says absolutely 
nothing about the parenting of any person or rights of that person in the 
parent-child relationship. 
Indeed, any conclusions related to parenting, character, or a child's 
best interests made on the basis of a parent's failure to emerge at a 
particular exit from the daunting maze that is U.S. immigration law 
would be misplaced. Commonly advanced comparisons of past 
generations of "legal" immigrants with immigrants currently lacking 
authorization are tenuous given the proliferation of barriers to legalizing 
status that simply did not exist for previous cohorts.70 Intergenerational 
interest in maintaining a relationship with their children which is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). 
66. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The court further 
noted: 
[T]he contemporary concern with and opprobrium towards undocumented aliens does not 
lead us to the conclusion that those who violate the laws to enter the United States can be 
subject without protest to any procedure or legislation, no matter how violative of the rights 
to which those persons would normally be entitled as persons in the United States. 
/d. at 499 n.19. 
67. Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.Jd 812, 818 (Nev. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2ooo) (noting that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control 
of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"); Lassiter v. Dep't of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need 
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference."' 
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 ( 1972))). 
68. Rico, 120 P.3d at 818. 
69. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 59-62. 
70. See Mae M. Ngai, How Grandma Got Legal, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at 813 (noting that 
"(t]he government excluded a mere I 'Yo of the 25 million immigrants who landed at Ellis Island before 
World War I, mostly for health reasons" and that the "Chinese were the exception, excluded on 
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comparisons often are not only misguided but also misinformed.7• Of 
those who successfully navigate the current law to become permanent 
residents, almost one-third lived without authorization in the United 
States at some point.72 
Certainly immigration law itself does not find a lack of authorized 
immigration status to be remotely indicative of either parenting ability or 
moral character. For example, persons without authorized immigration 
status who face removal from the United States may seek a form of relief 
in immigration court known as cancellation of removal.73 This requires 
them to prove, among other things, that they have simultaneously "been 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less 
than IO years"74 and have "been a person of good moral character during 
[that) period."75 In fiscal year 2006, 3,672 persons were granted 
cancellation of removal: each of these persons necessarily established 
that their unauthorized immigration status was consistent with a positive 
determination of good moral character.76 The absence of authorized 
immigration status is not intended as a measure of a person's character. 
For another example, the government routinely facilitates the 
removal of children, including U.S.-citizen children, together with 
parents who face removal from the United States pursuant to 
immigration law. Throughout the removal process, parents are charged 
with making critical decisions about the care and custody of their 
children. Indeed, Board of Immigration Appeals case law explicitly 
presumes that parents removed from the United States will continue as 
their caretakers after removal.77 Thus even when immigration law has 
grounds of 'racial unassimilability'"). 
71. See Brian Donohue, Many Immigrants Were Legal Only Because There Were No Rules, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 22, 2007, at 1 (noting that "if everyone's grandparents said they 
immigrated legally, someone's grandparents were lying" and that government statistics showed 1.4 
million unauthorized immigrants in 1925 when numerical restrictions on immigration were relatively 
new). 
72. MICHAEL E. Fix & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD 
STRAIGHT 21 (1994); see also Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 
483, 484 (2002) (noting that given the complexities of immigration law, it is not unusual that even the 
immigrant herself does not fully understand her immigration status and applicable protections from 
removal). 
73· See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2ooo). 
74· !d. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 
75· /d.§ 1229b(b)(r)(B). 
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at R3 tbl.15 (2007) (hereinafter YEARBOOK], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fyo6syb.pdf. 
77· See In re lge, 20 I. & N. Dec. 88o, 885 (B.I.A. 1994) ("The claim that the child will remain in 
the United States can easily be made for purposes of litigation, but most parents would not carry out 
such an alleged plan in reality. Therefore we will require, at a minimum, an affidavit from the parent 
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reached its harshest judgment and imposed removal from the United 
States, immigration law provides no indication that a parent's 
relationship to his or her child warrants any less respect due to lack of 
immigration status.78 
Ostensibly, "a custody decree is not meant to punish a parent, or 
anyone else; its only purpose is to help the children. "79 Placing weight on 
a parent's immigration status per se improperly moves the focus of child 
custody proceedings away from the best interests of the child. Parental 
rights are not affected by immigration status; neither are children's 
interests. A child has no less interest in maintaining a relationship with a 
parent on the basis of the parent's immigration status. Any attempt to 
argue that immigration status alone is relevant to the best interests of the 
child should be rejected out of hand as discriminatory and irrelevant. 
A bright line prohibition against any consideration of immigration 
status in child custody proceedings would stand as a firewall against 
discrimination and the intimidation inherent in parties' attempts to raise 
immigration status matters. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that the call for an absolute bar on the consideration of immigration 
status is the answer. While a strict prohibition on any mention of 
immigration status admittedly has appeal as one way of avoiding 
discrimination, it has significant downsides as well. One of these is the 
possibility that discrimination is simply converted to obfuscation. 
Another is that, quite apart from impermissible bias, immigration status 
does sometimes have real and tangible impacts on the lives of children. 
B. AccoMMODATION-ADDRESSING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN 
IMMIGRATION STATUS AND EvERYDAY REALITY 
A strict prohibition on raising immigration status issues in child 
custody matters would be difficult to maintain because immigration 
status does have an impact on the experiences of many immigrants and 
their families. This is especially true for mixed-status families that face 
or parents stating that it is their intention that the child remain in this country, accompanied by 
evidence demonstrating that reasonable provisions will be made for the child's care and support (such 
as staying with a relative or in a boarding school)."). 
78. See Acosta V. Gaffney, 558 F.2d II5J, II58 (Jd Cir. I977) (determining that parents can 
decide where the child will live after parents' deportation and assuming that parents generally will 
decide to keep their children with them); see also Salameda v. INS, 70 F.Jd 447, 45I (I995) ("In order 
to economize on its limited resources, the INS usually does not bother to institute a formal 
deportation proceeding against an alien who is likely to depart anyway, such as the minor child of 
parents who are being deported."). 
79· In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d I I I, I25 (Pa. Super. Ct. I982); see also Gaskill v. Gaskill, 
936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. I996) ("Custody should never be used to punish or reward the 
parents .... "). 
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daily conundrums as they interface with societal institutions unsure of 
the implications associated with the array of statuses that such families 
present. The influence of immigration status in shaping daily life can be 
logistical and practical, or it can be much more significant. In some cases, 
the influence of immigration status is vitally relevant to the 
determination of a child's interests. 
For example, as discussed above, immigration status can play a 
central role in establishing and perpetuating dynamics of family violence. 
In such instances, ignoring the power and influence of immigration status 
may be among the least appropriate choices. Any examination of 
families where immigration status is a strong negative force would be 
incomplete and misleading without reference to concerns related to 
immigration. Indeed, the very same American Bar Association report 
that calls for an absolute prohibition on raising immigration status in 
family court also notes that 
[o]ffering battered immigrant parents and their children a way out of 
violent homes requires that attorneys, judges, police, child protective 
service workers and advocates develop an understanding of immigrant 
parents' life experience, so that they may craft legal relief that will be 
effective in stopping violence while being respectful of their cultural 
• 8o 
expenences. 
It is important for family judges to realize that "[i]n many instances, 
the fact that battered immigrant women have no legal immigration status 
or documentation in the U.S. is a result of the batterer's use of the 
victim's immigration status as a weapon of abuse."8' Moreover, it may 
well be the case that in some instances "[a]n abuser's attempt to raise the 
other parent's immigration status . . . [itself] is evidence of on-going 
abuse."82 If this is the case, a court's inquiry into the abuser's motives and 
rationale for attempting to inject the issue of immigration status into the 
proceeding may be especially telling. Further, the strategic decision of a 
party or attorney in a particular case to educate a judge regarding the 
true impact of immigration status ought to not be prohibited or even 
discouraged.83 In such instances it may well be a person lacking 
8o. DAVIDSON, supra note 6o, at 19. 
81. Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women's Willingness to Call for Help and Police 
Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 43,55 (2003). 
82. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51. at 6; see also Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
("Courts have generally recognized the in terrorem effect of inquiring into a party's immigration status 
when irrelevant to any material claim."). 
83. See Orloff, supra note 81, at 46 ("The pervasive lack of understanding of the life experiences 
of battered immigrant women by the systems designed to protect battered women and immigrant 
victims greatly reduces the likelihood that immigrant victims will be able to escape the violence in 
their lives."). 
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immigration authorization who seeks to bring immigration concerns that 
are highly relevant to the child's best interests to the court's attention. 
The appropriate line in child custody matters cannot be, or at least 
cannot always be, drawn to enforce absolute silence about immigration 
status. This conclusion extends outside the realm of domestic violence, as 
immigration status unquestionably influences the lives of many 
immigrants and immigrant families in a variety of predictable and 
unpredictable ways. To argue that concerns related to immigration never 
impact the interests of children in any situation is not credible, and it is 
unrealistic to think that judges will or should completely ignore the 
persistent and pervasive collateral impact of immigration status on some 
children and families. Practically significant examples include 
establishing levels of child support or enforcing child support when 
parties are not unauthorized to work.84 Eligibility restrictions for 
important benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, 
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families may be highly relevant to 
some families. 85 If an affidavit of support is executed in support of an 
immigration application, this may have relevance to support issues.86 
It is important, however, to articulate limits on the court's 
consideration of immigration concerns to prevent the introduction of 
irrelevant stereotypes. For example, claims related to the insecurity and 
precariousness of immigrants' continuing presence in the United States 
are easily overstated.87 Millions of immigrants, without regard to 
immigration status, have regular employment and established homes in 
the United States. As the Supreme Court has remarked, the presence of 
a population lacking authorized immigration status in the United States 
is quite established.88 Even with occasional spikes in the enforcement of 
immigration laws, most unauthorized immigrants are unlikely to face 
84. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 70. 
85. See In re Kittridge, 714 N.Y.S.2d 653,654 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); see also NATIONAL IMMIGRANT 
LAW CENTER, IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC 
BENEFITS 759 (2005-<J6 ed.), available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/special/imm_elig_for_pub_bens_ 
aila_o305.pdf. 
86. See 8 U.S.C. § u82(a)(4)(C) (2000) (requiring affidavits of support in the context of family-
sponsored immigration); Abrams. Immigration Law, supra note 26, at I70Q-{)7 (discussing 
enforceability of affidavits of support in the context of immigration based on marriage). 
87. See In re Margarita T., No. A-95-530, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 397, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 
19, I995)· 
88. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1g82) (commenting on "the creation of a substantial 
'shadow population' of illegal migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders" which 
"raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to 
remain here as a source of cheap labor. but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents"). 
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removal.89 Even those in removal proceedings may be eligible for relief, 
such that "a State cannot realistically determine that any particular 
undocumented [person] will in fact be deported until after deportation 
proceedings have been completed."90 Immigrants in removal proceedings 
are entitled to due process protections that provide time from the 
initiation of proceedings to avenues of appeal to possible removal.9' In 
sum, a person's presence in the United States without authorized 
immigration status is not in and of itself evidence of instability. 
Similarly, many immigrants may face economic challenges and 
insecurities that impact their children's interests; mixed-status families 
"are more likely to be poor than other families."92 "Children in low-
income working immigrant families were more than twice as likely as 
those in comparable native families to lack health insurance coverage in 
2002"93 and children of immigrants are "significantly less likely to be in 
any regular nonparental child care arrangement. "94 The list could go on, 
but general statistics are irrelevant to child custody decisions. 
It is well established that "child custody disputes, by their very 
nature, must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis."95 Stereotypes and 
statistics are ill equipped to replace case-by-case inquiries about the lives 
of children required under the best interests standard. Millions of 
immigrants, with and without authorization, have unique experiences of 
life in the United States. Constant vigilance is required to combat 
89. In fiscal year 2006, 220,0S7 persons were ordered removed by immigration judges. See 
YEARBOOK, supra note 76, at D2. This represents just 1.8% of the estimated twelve million 
unauthorized immigrants in the United States. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2006, at I (2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill_pe_2oo6.pdf. Given the 
immigration enforcement focus on criminal noncitizens, the noncriminal immigrant faces a remarkably 
low probability of formal removal. In fact, for some demographic groups, statistical probability of 
removal generally is well less than the probability of incarceration for a crime. See Abrams, 
Immigration Status, supra note 29, at 9· 
90. Plyler, 4S7 U.S. at 226. 
91. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rei. Mezei, 34S U.S. 206, 212 (I9S3) (noting that persons 
"who have once passed through our gates. even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law"). 
92. Fix, supra note so. 
93· Capps et al., supra note so, at 4· 
94· /d. at s. 
9S· John A. v. Bridget M., 791 N.Y.S.2d 421, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2oos); see also Hicks v. Hicks. 
868 A.2d I24S, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2oos) ("It is well-established ... that custody and visitation 
matters are to be decided on the basis of the judicially determined 'best interests of the child' standard, 
on a case-by-case basis, considering all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child's 
physical, intellectual, moral. and spiritual well-being." (citation omitted)); see also Rico v. Rodriguez, 
120 P.3d 812, 817 (Nev. 2oos) ("Child custody determinations are by necessity made on a case-by-case 
basis."). 
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attempts to essentialize their experiences and replace individualized fact 
finding with assumption and stereotypes. 
As such, a critical limit must be placed on the consideration of 
immigration concerns in child custody, restricting such consideration to 
instances where immigration concerns are demonstrably relevant on an 
individualized basis to the best interests of the child. The proponent of 
considering immigration status or concerns must have the burden of 
establishing specific facts and their relevance to the best interests of the 
child. Forcing the proponent to articulate a rationale for the 
consideration of immigration status brings transparency to the best 
interest determination and reduces opportunities for discrimination and 
obfuscation. At the same time, this approach maintains flexibility in 
responding to the myriad unseen ways in which immigration law impacts 
lives.g6 It may well be that attempts to inject immigration-related 
concerns into child custody matters will rarely succeed, but the rejection 
of irrelevant bias based on immigration status per se does not preclude 
carefully delineated factual analysis of the collateral consequences of the 
workings of immigration law on children. 
Opening the door to considering the collateral consequences of 
immigration status creates a tremendous challenge for immigrants and 
their advocates to combat stereotypes and assumptions, lest 
discrimination simply take the guise of fact-finding. This approach, 
however, is in accord with a growing consensus that the potential 
complications of immigration law in the lives of children and families 
must be acknowledged, understood, and, when appropriate, affirmatively 
addressed in legal representation.97 
c. MANIPULATION-KEEPING PERSPECTIVE AND GETIING IT RIGHT 
All persons working in family courts "need to understand certain 
aspects of immigration law simply because in the process of conducting 
normal business they may unknowingly make decisions with far-reaching 
immigration consequences."gS Understanding the impact that will result is 
96. The unpredictability of immigration law's impact in the lives of children and families makes a 
more rigid barrier to use of immigration status less appealing. But see Abrams, supra note 29, at 98 
(proposing "a presumption that immigration status is not relevant in child custody disputes, coupled 
with specific classes of cases in which the presumption could be rebutted"). 
97· See, e.g., Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: 
Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham. 6 Nev. LJ. 592,597 (2oo6) ("In juvenile justice 
and child welfare proceedings, children's attorneys should understand the interconnections to other 
related substantive areas, such as health, housing, public benefits, education, domestic violence, 
immigration, and transnational issues .... "). 
98. KATHERINE BRADY & SALLY KINOSHITA, IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY 
COURT JuDGES 2 (2005), available at www.ilrc.orglresources/sijs/2005o/o2oSIJSo/o2obenchbook.pdf. 
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one thing, yet consciously adjusting family law determinations to tailor 
immigration impact is a step further. A final approach by which parties 
and courts inject considerations of immigration status into child custody 
matters is by manipulating proceedings and outcomes to facilitate 
particular immigration outcomes. Requests for the court to consider 
immigration status for such a purpose frequently originate with or on 
behalf of persons lacking immigration status. For example, because an 
adoption finalized after a child reaches the age of sixteen is not 
recognized for immigration purposes,99 expediting an adoption 
proceeding may be in the best interests of the child. In such instances, an 
open request for the court to consider immigration status in the 
proceeding often is made. The requested manipulation only remotely 
implicates the rights of other parties and likely is unobjectionable. 
Going further, one court decided that it was in the best interests of a 
child to remain with his mother in the United States, where his father 
also resided and a family support network existed, then it refused to 
divorce the child's parents in favor of a legal separation with the hope 
that it would entice the father to follow through with a petition necessary 
for the mother to obtain legal immigration status. 100 After determining 
that it was in the child's best interests to remain with his mother in the 
United States, the court logically concluded that it was in the child's 
interest for his mother to obtain the immigration authorization that she 
desired. 101 In attempting to facilitate this result, however, the court 
impinged greatly on the father's right to divorce. 102 In such a case, 
manipulation is done "with sympathetic intent, but it can make outcomes 
inconsistent, unpredictable and, at least from the perspective of some 
parties, unfair." 103 
In the case described at the outset of this Article, a family court 
judge expressed concern that two undocumented children faced "too 
many dangers ... specifically a threat of deportation or whatnot to have 
the children continue to reside with [their undocumented mother]."104 
The court was convinced by the father's attorney that naming the father 
as primary custodian of the children would shorten the time for the 
children to obtain legal immigration status "by as much as five years." 105 
99· See 8 U.S.C. § uor(b)(r)(E) (2ooo); see also infra note r6r and accompanying text. 
roo. See Velez v. Velez, No. I0·4I-8r, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139, at *ro (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 7, 1994). 
ror. /d. at 6-7, 9 n.r. 
I 02. See id. at ro. 
103. David B. Thronson & Veronica Tobar Thronson, Immigrants and the Family Courts, NEV. 
LAWYER, Jan. 2oo6, at 30. 
104. See Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 3· 
ros. /d. at 4· 
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In fact, the legal authority relied upon for this proposition was a 
citizenship statute that had been repealed three years earlier and which, 
even when in effect, had no applicability to undocumented children who 
were not yet permanent residents. 106 In other words, the legal analysis 
that "was tantamount in the Court's decision"'07 was fatally flawed. In 
fact, the assignment of custody to the father made no difference in the 
timing or range of options for the children to obtain immigration status. 
These cases highlight several concerns that appear when courts 
attempt to manipulate immigration results in the child custody context. 
First, manipulation may fail to account for the rights of all parties. 
Manipulation in favor of one may be benign or may discriminate against 
another party. Second, judges may put unwarranted emphasis on the 
importance of children obtaining legal immigration status or citizenship. 
Actions that promote the acquisition of legal immigration status and 
citizenship may be positive, but this is not universally true. Moreover, 
achieving a different immigration or citizenship status is but one piece of 
a larger puzzle. Trading daily contact with a mother for the sake of a 
green card is a questionable proposition for most children. Third, it is 
vital that family courts that attempt to engage in tailoring family court 
rulings to facilitate immigration outcomes understand the relevant 
immigration law. In the unforgiving world of immigration law, 
manipulation gone wrong can be disastrous. Moreover, even if no harm 
is caused on the immigration front, there is harm if a child custody 
determination is warped by an inaccurate reading of immigration law. 
Most family court judges and attorneys are not especially familiar with 
immigration law, and it is easy for misunderstandings to arise. More is 
needed than mere mechanical knowledge of how child custody might 
influence immigration outcomes. If immigration law considerations are 
to have any place in child custody proceedings, an exploration of the 
nature and values expressed in immigration law's treatment of children 
and child custody is in order. With these caveats in mind, the next section 
of this Article provides an analysis of the role of child custody in 
immigration and nationality law. 
106. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law Regarding Derivative of Citizenship of the Minor 
Children at 2, Rodriguez v. Rico, No. 303041 (Nev. Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. July 17, 2003) (on file with 
author); see Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 7-S, Rodriguez v. Rico, No. 303041 (Nev. Jud. Dist. 
Ct. Fam. Div. Oct. 3, 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1432 which was repealed by section 103(a) of the Child 
Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 163} (on file with author). 
107. See Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 4· 
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II. THE ERRATIC ROLE OF CHILD CUSTODY IN 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 
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One of the more seemingly straightforward pitches for considering 
immigration and citizenship status that parties in child custody disputes 
advance is that the assignment of custody to one parent will influence or 
determine the children's immigration or citizenship status. This section 
sets out a thorough analysis of the erratic role of child custody in 
immigration and nationality law. Only when a court understands the 
impact of a child custody determination in immigration law can it 
evaluate how immigration law might impact the best interests of the child 
determination in a child custody dispute. Moreover, determining the 
significance of child custody in immigration and nationality law requires 
contextualization in the treatment of children more generally in these 
frameworks. This examination of the role of child custody in immigration 
and nationality law therefore also can serve to acquaint judges with the 
nature and values of the immigration system that they often are asked to 
take into account. 
A. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP DISTINGUISHED 
Understanding the role of child custody in immigration law requires 
a basic conception of the structure of U.S. immigration and nationality 
laws, especially as the laws apply to children. First, it is important to 
distinguish between immigration law and citizenship or nationality law. 
While closely related, the distinction is important because the two areas 
treat children distinctly. Indeed, the term "child" is even defined 
differently for purposes of immigration law and citizenship law, and child 
custody plays a distinct role in each context. 108 
Immigration and nationality laws are set out in separate statutory 
chapters of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Traditionally, 
immigration law concerns which noncitizens'09 may be admitted to the 
United States, how long they may remain, and the process by which 
persons unable to remain are removed. no These provisions are set out in 
108. See 8 U.S.C. § r ror(b)(r) (2000) (defining child for immigration purposes); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ uor(c)(r) (2000) (defining child for nationality purposes). 
109. Immigration statutes refer to all noncitizens by the term "alien," defined as "any person not a 
citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (2000). The persistent use of "alien" as 
a pejorative for the smaller population of persons lacking authorization to remain in the United States 
blurs its more precise technical meaning as anyone not a U.S. citizen. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, 
"Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263, 268 (1997). In this Article I use the term "noncitizen" except in direct 
quotation. 
IIO. Immigration law defines "immigrant" in the negative as "every alien except an alien who is 
within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens." 8 U.S.C. § uor(a)(15) (2000) (setting 
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Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act."' 
Immigration laws set forth a multitude of temporary visa statuses as 
well as the status of lawful permanent resident.", Immigrants granted 
permanent resident status presumptively are permitted to remain 
indefinitely in the United States."3 Additionally, permanent residents 
may work in the United States,"4 travel outside the country and return,"5 
sponsor specified relatives for immigration status"6 and, in some 
instances after statutory waiting periods that can last many years, receive 
many forms of public benefits."7 Still, permanent residents are subject to 
removal from the United States based upon commission of certain acts 
designated by statutes. These statutes have been subject to frequent 
modifications that, in some instances, are applied retroactively."8 
Permanent residents also may abandon their status by leaving the United 
States for too long a period. "9 In addition to the uncertainties that can 
accompany legal permanent resident status, noncitizens receive much 
less favorable treatment under immigration laws in petitioning for their 
relatives to receive immigration benefits. Permanent residents, 
moreover, are not permitted the full voting and participation rights in the 
political process that are available to U.S. citizens. 
Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets out the 
statutory framework for becoming a U.S. citizen."o Becoming a U.S. 
citizen is most commonly achieved through birth within the United 
forth categories of nonimmigrant visas). Moreover, the law mandates that "[e]very alien ... shall be 
presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time 
of application for a visa, ... that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status under [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)]." 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2ooo). It is thus entirely accurate to use the term "immigrant" for 
many noncitizens who lack legal authorization to remain in the United States. 
III. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1363a (2ooo). 
112. This status is variously referred to as lawful permanent resident, legal permanent resident, 
having a green card, LPR, and permanent resident. These variations in name and usage reflect no 
difference in legal status and this article will adopt the term permanent resident. 
113. See 8 U.S.C. § II8I (2000). Some other forms of immigration relief are potentially of 
indefinite duration, subject to other considerations such as shifting country conditions. See, e.g., 8 
U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (asylum); id. § 123I (2ooo) (withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2007) 
(relief from removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture). 
I I4. See 8 U.S.C. § I324a(b)( I)(B)(ii) (2000). 
115. See id. § IIOI(a)(13)(C). 
116. See id. § I I54(a). 
117. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of I996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (I996) (introducing distinctions in the availability of public benefits 
between citizens and legal permanent residents). 
I I8. See 8 U.S.C. § I227(a) (2000) (setting out general "classifications of deportable aliens"). 
119. /d.§ 1101(a)(I3)(C)(ii). 
120. See id. §§ I40I-I504. 
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States, or jus soli citizenship.' 2 ' Citizenship also is extended by statute to 
persons not covered by the geographic reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, such as children born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent who 
meets certain other requirements.' 22 Persons not born with U.S. 
citizenship may qualify to naturalize as citizens after obtaining and 
holding permanent resident status for a requisite number of years and 
meeting a host of other requirements."3 Finally, and importantly, under 
certain circumstances children may "derive" U.S. citizenship from their 
parent's naturalization or citizenship."4 
Generally, when a person is not a permanent resident, immigration 
law is much more present than nationality law. For those who were not 
born as U.S. citizens, the intermediate step of permanent residency, 
however briefly held in the case of some children who derive citizenship, 
is a necessary step on the path to becoming a citizen.'25 For those granted 
permanent residency, nationality law takes on new relevance in 
regulating naturalization."6 
With this framework of immigration and nationality laws in mind, 
the role of child custody in each setting can be explored. As will be seen, 
the related and sometimes interwoven laws of immigration and 
nationality exhibit a striking lack of consistency in the treatment of 
children and the importance of child custody. What emerges is not a 
thoughtful and reasoned pattern but rather a haphazard scheme, 
occasionally to the random benefit of children yet often capriciously 
harmful. 
B. CHILD CusToDY IN PARENT-CENTERED IMMIGRATION LAw 
In reviewing immigration law's treatment of children, child custody 
is revealed as a bit player in support of the star: immigration law's 
peculiar notion of the parent-child relationship. Even in its relatively 
minor role, however, child custody is ever-present and takes on 
I2I. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside."); see also infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
I22. See 8 U.S.C. §§ I40I, 1409 (2ooo); see also infra notes 242-43, 246-47, 250 and accompanying 
text. 
I23. See 8 U.S.C. § 142I (2000); see also infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
I24. See 8 U.S.C. §§ I431, 1433 (2ooo); see also infra notes 256, 258-59, 262, 284, 285 and 
accompanying text. 
125. See, e.g., 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § g8.o3[3][f] (2006) 
("A basic requirement for the transmission of derivative citizenship is that the child must become a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States before attaining the prescribed age of maturity."). 
126. One error in the legal analysis of the Rico v. Rodriguez case discussed above was putting the 
cart ahead of the horse in turning to nationality law for children who were not yet permanent 
residents. See discussion supra at note 67 and accompanying text. 
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undeniable and, in some instances, indefensible importance. The 
discussion below explains how the parent-child role mediates children's 
access to immigration benefits and then describes the curious role of 
child custody in processes by which immigration law recognizes a parent-
child relationship. 
r. The Right Parent- The Central Role of the Parent-Child 
Relationship in Immigration Law 
The parent-child relationship is central to children's access to the 
three primary avenues for permanent immigration to the United States: 
family-sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, and 
diversity immigration. 127 Though other provisions make immigration 
relief available to smaller numbers in response to particular situations, 
such as provisions that prohibit the return of persons to countries where 
they would face torture' 28 or where they have a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of specified grounds, 129 the above three primary 
avenues encompass the vast bulk of legal immigration. 
Of the three primary avenues, family-sponsored immigration is 
directly responsible for the largest portion of legal immigration, 
accounting for 63% of legal immigration in fiscal year 2006.'30 Under the 
family-sponsored immigration scheme, adult U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents (petitioners) are permitted to file papers requesting that family 
members who have designated relationships (beneficiaries) be allowed to 
immigrate to the United States.'3' Applications are categorized based on 
both the immigration and citizenship status of petitioners and their 
relationship to beneficiaries. Citizen petitioners are granted priority over 
127. See 8 U.S.C. § IISI(a) (2000); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
PoLICY 241 (4th ed. zoos). The diversity program awards a fixed number of visas via a lottery to 
applicants from "low admission states" and "low admission regions." Ostensibly, the visa lottery is 
intended to diversify the flow of immigrants, which in practice has meant that "the so-called diversity 
visa system favors white immigrants by preferring noncitizens from 'low-immigrant countries' in the 
allocation of visas." Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, SI UCLA L. REv. I93, 220 (2003); see also Bill 
Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 559, 587--89 
(describing effective exclusion of Asians and Latinos from diversity lottery scheme); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 321, 329-30 (1993); 
Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in Three Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative Action, and the 
Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALB. L. REv. 375,382--83 (2002). 
128. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.r6 (zooo) (relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture). 
129. See 8 U.S.C. § r rs8 (zooo) (asylum); id. § I231 (zooo) (withholding of removal). 
130. KELLY JEFFERYS, U.S. 0EP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL 
fLOW REPORT: U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2006 I (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
statistics/publications/IS-4496_LPRFlowReport_o4vaccessible.pdf. Of the 1,266,264 total admissions as 
permanent residents, 803,335 were through the family-sponsored program. /d. 
I3!. See 8 U.S.C. §§ IISI(b)(2)(A)(i), II53(a) (2000). But cf BILL 0NG HING, DEPORTING OuR 
SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY I I9 (2oo6) ("Once Asian and Latin immigrants 
began to dominate the family categories, the kinship system was attacked."). 
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legal permanent resident petitioners, and traditional nuclear family 
relationships are granted priority over family relationships that 
immigration law deems less important. 132 The parent -child relationship is 
prominent in this hierarchy, and even the sibling relationship requires 
evidence of shared parentage. This framework is rigidly followed and 
family relationships not specified by statute do not qualify. 133 
The family-sponsored immigration system permits U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident parents to petition for the permanent residency of 
their children under age twenty-one. 134 Further, children of parents who 
are direct beneficiaries of spousal, adult son or daughter, or sibling 
petitions sometimes may benefit derivatively from the primary petition. 135 
The most preferred category, which includes U.S. citizens petitioning for 
children, has no numerical limits and thus no backlog except that arising 
from bureaucratic delay. 136 Other categories are numerically limited and 
backlogs of many years have developed, such as a delay of more than five 
years for a permanent resident petitioning for a child or spouse. 137 In 
total, children comprised 29% of new permanent residents via family-
sponsored immigration provisions in fiscal year 2005. 138 
Additionally, family relationships are responsible for significant 
portions of the other two primary immigration avenues as children and 
132. See HING, supra note 131, at 1. Immigration law continues its reliance on the model of 
traditional nuclear families despite their diminished dominance and the increasing prevalence of 
alternative families. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and 
Marriage? Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 HoFSTRA L. REv. 273, 276 (2003). 
133. See Suriel de Batista v. Gonzalez, 494 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that 
nephew raised as a son qualified as child); Moreno-Morante v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d 1172, 1176-78 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that grandparent with legal guardianship of grandchildren was not parent of "de 
facto" children). 
134. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2ooo). 
135. See id. § 1153(d). 
136. See id. § II5I(b). The absence of a backlog related to numerical limitation does not mean that 
bureaucratic delays in processing are insignificant. They generally last many months and sometimes 
years. 
137. According to the July 2007 Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State, the government 
then was processing visas for the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents who applied 
in June 2002, a wait of slightly more than five years. U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin for July 2007, 
http://travel.state.gov/visaffrvi/bulletin/bulletin-.3258.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2008). Due to per 
country limits, the wait is longer for countries of high immigration-in this same month the 
government began processing applications filed nearly six years earlier in August 2001 for the spouses 
and minor children of legal permanent residents coming from Mexico. /d. The longest backlog was for 
the lowest priority category, siblings of U.S. citizens, from the Philippines-in July 2007 the 
government began processing applications filed twenty-two years earlier in April 1985. 
138. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2005 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 2o-23 tbl.7 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ 
yearbookl2oo5/0IS_2oo5_ Yearbook. pdf (showing 187,949 of 649,201 family-sponsored immigrants in 
derivative child classifications). 
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 
spouses often may be included as "derivatives" of principal immigrants 
granted employment-based visas and diversity visas. 139 As derivatives, in 
fiscal year 2005 children comprised 24% of new permanent residents via 
the employment-based avenue140 and 24% of new permanent residents 
via the diversity route. 141 Overall, 26% of new permanent residents were 
under age twenty-one in fiscal year 2006.142 
Given the numbers of children who benefit from this scheme, it is 
easy to perceive the immigration system as one designed with children's 
interests in mind. However, immigration law devalues children's interests 
and their roles in families. The primary mechanism to accomplish this is 
by subordinating children's interests to those of their parents. Children 
only benefit from major immigration programs if their parents benefit 
and then only if their parents choose to share this benefit with them. 
When parents have or achieve legal immigration status or 
citizenship, they may be able to include children or extend this benefit to 
them. 143 Even if legally entitled, parents may choose not to do so and an 
"unfortunately common problem with the family-based immigration 
regime ... [is that] [d]erivative beneficiaries are just that-derivative-
meaning that they have few rights of their own and instead depend on 
the competence and cooperation of the principal immigrant."144 Even if 
parents are cooperative, not all are competent. Children are held back in 
this system by parents who do not qualify, are disqualified by some 
aspect of their background such as a criminal record or immigration 
violation, or are simply unsuccessful in steering a course through the 
minefield of immigration by, for example, not using an attorney but 
rather trusting a "notario" who files botched papers. 145 
I39· See 8 U.S.C. § II53(d) (2000). For example, the spouse and minor children of the recipient of 
a diversity immigrant visa may qualify to accompany the principal immigrant. 
I40. Of 246,877 employment-based admissions to legal permanent residents, 6o,I8I or 24% were 
issued to children of the principal immigrant worker. See U.S. DEP'T OF HoMELAND SEC., supra note 
I38, at 2I-22 at tbl.7 (2oo6). 
I4I. /d. (showing ro,g87 of 46,234 diversity visas issued to children). 
I42. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2006 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 25 tbl.8 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ 
yearbook/2oo6/0IS_2oo6_ Yearbook. pdf (showing 329,599 of the total I,266,264 legal permanent 
residents under age twenty-one). 
I43· See 8 U.S.C. § II5I(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (relating to petitions for children by U.S. citizen 
parents); id. § I 153(a)(2) (relating to petitions for children by permanent resident parents). 
I44. Fomalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523,527-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing abusive father's failure 
to include his seventeen-year-old son in an immigration petition for other family members which led 
to determination to deport him alone back to Poland while leaving his mother and siblings in the 
United States). 
145. See Thronson, supra note 28, at I I82 ("To the extent that the framework for family-sponsored 
and derivative immigration tends to achieve family integrity, it does so by ceding control over a child's 
status to parents and by denying opportunities for children to achieve legal status as children without 
February 2008] CUSTODY AND CONTRADICTIONS 
In contrast, when children rather than parents have legal 
immigration status or citizenship, they are not able to petition for parents 
or siblings.'46 The result is an asymmetric system, "geared to assimilate 
children's status to that of their parents, not the other way around."'47 
Immigration law's view of family is entirely parent-centered, as "the 
family immigration provisions of immigration law turn a blind eye to 
families in which only children hold legal immigration status. Children's 
interests in family integrity do not serve as a basis for possible extension 
of immigration status."'48 
Immigration law, therefore, does not provide any benefit on the 
basis of being a child generally, but rather only on the basis of being 
someone's child. '49 More specifically, the key to accessing immigration 
benefits as a child lies in having the right parent, i.e. a successful 
immigrant or U.S. citizen. Moreover, children must have a parent-child 
relationship that immigration law will recognize. 
2. "Some but Not All"- Child Custody and the Definition of a 
"Child" 
Immigration law provides benefits as "children" only to those who 
happen to be the children of parents who competently navigate the 
immigration and nationality system. Children who lack such a parent are 
their parents."). 
I46. U.S. citizens may petition for their parents, but not until they reach age twenty-one. 8 U.S.C. 
§ IISI(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
I47· Thronson, supra note so, at 7I; see Thronson, supra note 28, at I I82 ("If the parents' attempts 
to immigrate fail, the attempts of their derivative children will fail as well. In other words, this 
framework is set up in a manner that seeks to ensure that children will not acquire any immigration 
rights denied to parents through family related immigration."); see also Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere 
Fortuity" of Birth? Are Children Citizens?, IS DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD., Summer 
2004, at 9I, 9S (discussing the "striking asymmetry in the family reunification rights of similarly placed 
adults and minor children"). 
I48. Thronson, supra note so, at 72. 
I49· Though not able to claim an immigration benefit based on being a child and not accorded 
procedural or substantive accommodation as a child, unaccompanied children may apply in the same 
manner as adults for other forms of immigration relief for which they might qualify, including as 
asylum or protection from removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 
Reno, 2I2 F.3d I338, I347 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming that any person, regardless of age, may apply 
for asylum); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and 
Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, IS B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 2I9, 2I9 (2006). In 
immigration law the dominant view of children as objects often improperly inhibits children from 
advancing their individual rights and perspectives, especially when they are not alone. Cf Don v. 
Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 738,739 n.I (9th Cir. 2007) ("Don is the principal or lead petitioner; his wife's and 
child's petitions are derivative of his petition. Therefore, their asylum claims succeed or fail with Don's 
claims."). Finally, a form of immigration relief known as special immigrant juvenile status is available 
to some undocumented children who are dependent upon a juvenile court. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ IIOI(a)(27)(J) (2ooo); David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of 
Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHio ST. L.J. 979,998 n.II6 (2002). 
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excluded from any benefit under dominant avenues of legal immigration. 
Even children with the "right" parent face another barrier: for purposes 
of immigration law, a child is recognized as a "child" only by conforming 
to a statutory definition the Supreme Court has described as 
"particularly exhaustive. "'5" 
Whether a child fits the legal definition of a "child" under 
immigration law determines whether even a willing parent with 
qualifying immigration or citizenship status can petition for the child to 
receive an immigration benefit on the basis of being a child. Child 
custody plays a fickle role in this definition, always present and 
sporadically prominent. As perhaps should be expected given the parent-
centered nature of the family-sponsored immigration system, notions of 
dependency are pervasive in immigration law's definition of a "child," 
with roots that run deep. 
In 1882 the first general immigration law enshrined the nation's 
disfavor of poor immigrants by specifically excluding from admission to 
the country any person likely to become a public charge.'5' This 
restriction on admission to the United States has survived every revision 
of immigration law and remains in place today. '52 One way persons may 
demonstrate that they will not become a public charge is by establishing 
their dependency upon someone else: when Congress reaffirmed the 
exclusion of the poor in an 1891 statute it added the proviso that "this 
section shall not be held to exclude persons living in the United States 
from sending for a relative."'53 This early pattern of allowing a relative 
established in the United States to extend an immigration benefit persists 
in modern immigration law in the United States. 
Though not at first explicit, the law and attitudes of the late 
nineteenth century certainly contemplated that those able to extend an 
immigration benefit to their relatives would be husbands and fathers, not 
wives, mothers and children. In 1903, immigration law was amended to 
provide that when a noncitizen 
send[s] for his wife or minor children to join him, if said wife, or either 
of said children, shall be found to be affected with any contagious 
150. INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85,88 (rg86) (per curiam). 
151. See Act of Aug. 3, r882, ch. 376, § 3 ("[l]f on ... examination there shall be found among such 
passengers ... any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public 
charge ... such persons shall not be permitted to land."). Those likely to become a public charge were 
joined in the excluded category by "idiots," "lunatics," and "convicts." /d. 
152. See 8 U.S.C. § II82(a)(4) (2000) ("Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the 
time of the application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application 
for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible."). 
153. Act of Mar. 3, r8gr, ch. 551, § r, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084. 
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disorder, and if it is proved that said disorder was contracted on board 
the ship in which they came ... such wife or children shall be held ... 
until it shall be determined whether the disorder will be easily curable, 
or whether they can be permitted to land without danger to other 
persons; and they shall not be deported until such facts have been 
ascertained.'54 
This small protection from deportation is an example of another 
lasting pattern in immigration law in which family relationships may be 
the basis for relief from deportation that the law otherwise would 
require. As is still the case, the benefit flows from parent to child and not 
in the other direction. 
Lest there was any doubt that children were viewed as those to be 
sent for and not those doing the sending, immigration law soon 
specifically excluded "all children under sixteen years of age, 
unaccompanied by one or both of their parents."'55 Children, therefore, 
were admissible only as dependents and not as individuals; as objects not 
agents. In this respect, before any numerical restrictions on immigration 
were put in place and long before family relationships formally were 
ensconced as the dominant means to immigrate to the United States, 
immigration law embraced a limited view of children as dependents. This 
devaluation of children persists today in immigration law. 
For the purposes of immigration law as set out in Title II of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, "child" is an evolving term of art 
limited to "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age" who 
falls into one of six'56 precisely delimited categories, the relevant portions 
of which are set out below: 
1. A "child born in wedlock";'57 
2. A "stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the 
child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the 
marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred";'58 
3· A "child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or 
154. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 37, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898, 899. 
155. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, Pub. L. No. 57-162,32 Stat. 1213, 1221. 
156. See Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, Title III, § 302(a), Title V, 
§ 505(a)(2), (b), II4 Stat. 838, 844 (2000) (noting that a seventh category related to adopted children 
"shall take effect upon the entry into force of the Convention [on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption done at The Hague on May 29, 1993] for the United 
States pursuant to Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention"). For the U.S. Department of State's 
description of the convoluted ratification saga of this convention, see http://travel.state.gov/family/ 
adoption/convention/convention_2290.html. The future language that potentially will be incorporated 
by this pending amendment to the definition of child does not alter the analysis in this article. 
157· 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
158. /d.§ IIOI(b)(1)(B). 
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domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile, 
whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place 
before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the 
legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such 
legitimation";'59 
4· A "child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose 
behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the 
relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if 
the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the 
person"; 100 
5· A "child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child 
has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting 
parent or parents for at least two years";' 6' 
6. A "child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his 
behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section 
II5 1 (b) of this title, who is an orphan because of the death or 
disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss 
from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is 
incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably 
released the child for emigration and adoption; who has been adopted 
abroad by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an 
unmarried United States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who 
personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption 
proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a 
United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United 
States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who have or has 
complied with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child's 
proposed residence."'6' 
The circularity inherent in defining a "child" for immigration purposes 
by using the term "child" in each subpart is the first indication that this 
definition is designed to exclude many children. Not every child will be a 
"child" for immigration purposes. 
The parameters of these categories are construed quite literally and 
functional equivalents are rejected. Relationships falling outside the 
precise language of the statute that mimic, approximate or functionally 
match these categories are not sufficient to establish a parent-child 
159· Jd. § IIOI{b){I)(C). 
160. !d.§ IIOI{b){r)(D). 
161. !d. § uor{b){r)(E)(i). Additionally. a natural sibling of a child adopted while under age 
sixteen may qualify as a child for immigration purposes on the basis of an adoption finalized while 
under age eighteen. See id. § rror(B)(r)(E)(ii). 
162. /d.§ IIOI{b){r)(F)(i). 
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relationship for immigration purposes.'63 For example, "even if [an 
aunt's] relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child 
relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the plain 
language of the statute, precluded this functional approach to defining 
the term 'child."''64 Similarly, without regard to the actual assumption of 
parenting responsibilities, a parent-child relationship for immigration 
purposes is not formed between a man and the young son of the womc.n 
with whom he lives for many years,' 65 between a grandfather and his 
grandchildren-although he is their legal guardian,'66 or between a 
woman and a nephew raised as a son. '67 
In tightly construing this statutory language, courts are not unaware 
of the resulting harsh results. "To be sure, the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act's] definition of 'child' may be far out of step with the 
times, and may have particularly deleterious effects on aliens whose 
culture's definition of 'family' is legitimately broader than the traditional 
definition of those related by blood or adoption."'68 Still, "[a]s we have 
explained with the technical definition of 'child' contained within this 
statute: ... 'it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a 
different point ... [but] these are policy questions entrusted exclusively 
to the political branches of our government."''69 
In establishing a parent-child relationship for immigration purposes, 
therefore, the fine print is critical and implicates child custody in a 
variety of ways. The precise requirements of the statutory definition are 
sometimes in accord with baseline principles and broader trends in 
family law, but often they are out of step with family law precepts, thus 
warranting serious constitutional scrutiny if not ansmg in the 
immigration and nationality context. In carving out statutory subsets of 
the definition of "children," child custody plays a quirky and inconsistent 
part. 
163. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Road map for the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 
43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 511, 529 (1995) (noting that the Immigration and Nationality Act "enumerates 
recognized family relationships, and the courts have consistently rejected attempts to use surrogate 
family relationships to meet statutory requirements"). 
164. INS v. Hector. 479 U.S. 85. 90 (1986) (per curiam) (reversing decision that that nieces aged 
ten and eleven in the care of aunt for three years were the "functional equivalent" of children under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
165. See Dorado v. Gonzalez. 202 F. App'x 898, 899 (6th Cir. 2oo6). 
166. See Moreno-Morante v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d I I72. I 176-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument 
that grandchildren were "de facto" children). 
167. See Perez Suriel de Batista v. Gonzalez, 494 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2007). 
168. Dorado, 202 F. App'x at 902. 
I69. INS, 479 U.S. at 89 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell. 430 U.S. 787,798 (I977)). 
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a. Child Custody, Gender, and Legitimacy 
When a child is born to unmarried parents, for immigration purposes 
the child is and remains a "child" of the "natural" mother without regard 
to the subsequent relationship between the mother and child.'70 The same 
is not true between children and fathers. With respect to fathers, 
immigration law is more concerned with legitimacy than with biology.'7' 
Establishing paternity is just the starting point for children born out of 
wedlock: under immigration law, creation of a parent-child relationship 
with a father requires that the father either has formally "legitimated" 
the child or "has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship" with the 
child.' 7' 
Legitimacy has played an important role in immigration law even 
without the gender distinction that triggers its relevance today. In 1952, 
the original statutory definition of "child" for immigration purposes 
included, along with stepchildren, only "legitimate" or "legitimated" 
children. '73 Applying this early statutory definition resulted in denial of 
an immigration petition from a U.S. citizen woman for her daughter 
"fathered by a man other than the man the petitioner subsequently 
married."'74 This harshness was ameliorated in 1957 by adding to the 
definition of "child" those "illegitimate child[ren], by, through whom, or 
on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the 
relationship of the child to its natural mother. "'75 Short of legitimation, 
however, a child still could not establish a parent-child relationship with 
a biological father. 
In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional 
170. See 8 U.S.C. § rror(b)(r)(A) (2000) (if born in wedlock); see id. § uor(b)(r)(D) (if born out 
of wedlock). 
I7I. See THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE Il4 (1993) ("An overt gender distinction is made in the definition 
of the term 'illegitimate' child under the immigration and nationality laws."). In 1995, Congress shifted 
from use of the term "legitimate" to "born in wedlock" in parts of the statutory definition of child, but 
left the term in other parts. Compare 8 U.S.C. § uor(b)(r)(A) (2000) (using the term "born in 
wedlock"), with 8 U.S.C. § rror(b)(r)(C) (2ooo) (using the term "legitimate"). 
I72. 8 U.S.C. § r ror(b)(r)(D) (2ooo). 
I73· The relevant version of the statute defined a child as unmarried and 
(A) A legitimate child; or (B) A stepchild, provided the child had not reached the age of I8 
years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred; or (C) A child 
legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the Jaw of the 
father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation 
takes place before the child reaches the age of r8 years and the child is in the legal custody 
of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation. 
Act of June 27, I952, ch. 477. Pub. L. No. 82-414,66 Stat. 163, I7I (I952). 
I74· Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 284 (B.I.A. I953). 
I75· Act of Sept. II, I957, § 2, Pub. L. No. 85-3I6, 71 Stat. 639,639. 
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challenge to this "double-barreled" discrimination "based on sex and 
illegitimacy" in the definition of "child."'76 The Court found the statute's 
distinctions between fathers and mothers and between children born in 
and out of marriage among "many drawn by Congress pursuant to its 
determination to provide some-but not all-families with relief from 
various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder 
reunification of the family in this country." 177 There "is good reason to 
think that Fiallo, decided in 1977, would come out similarly today" given 
the Court's more recent pronouncement in the citizenship context 
upholding the "constitutionality of requirements that discriminated 
against illegitimate children born abroad to U.S.-born fathers who sought 
citizenship rather than immigration status."'78 
In other contexts, the troubling notion of devaluing children as 
"illegitimate" based on their parents' marital options and decisions is 
plainly in disfavor. '79 The Supreme Court has observed that 
[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's 
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. 
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and 
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is 
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. 
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the 
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of 
deterring the parent. 180 
176. 430 U.S. 787,794 (1977). At the time, the statutory definition of "child" contained no 
provisions regarding fathers with bona fide relationships with their children. See 8 U .S.C. 
§ IIOI(b)(I)(D) (1977). 
177. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977); cf Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and 
Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 267, 269 (2002) (observing that through federal tax law 
"the government only supports some children" and "[t]he children it supports most-either directly or 
indirectly-are children in family settings that include marriage"). 
178. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1643 (discussing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 
(2001)). Abrams goes on to note that "[t]he government has a legitimate interest, the Court found, in 
giving citizenship status to children who have a genuine relationship with their citizen parent, and 
because women are 'present' at the birth of their children, they are more likely than men to develop 
such a relationship." !d. 
179. For example, the Supreme Court has "reiterated that a statute completely disinheriting a 
nonmarital child from its father's estate unless the child is subsequently legitimated by the marriage of 
its parents is unconstitutional." Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional 
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 112 n.64 (citing Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-55 (1986)). 
Brashier also comments that "[t]he decreasing stigma attached to a nonmarital child's status is perhaps 
implicitly reflected in the Reed opinion in which the Court refers to the protection of children born out 
of wedlock rather than to illegitimates." !d.; see also Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal 
Orphan": Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. REv. 125, 
148-52 (2005). 
180. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); accord N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. 
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Federal power regarding immigrants is not unlimited. At the least, 
outside "matters of admission, exclusion, and deportation ... the alien 
inhabits the domain of territorially present persons where different and 
more protective rules against government power apply." 181 Still, 
distinctions in federal laws directly regulating immigration admissions 
and nationality have demonstrated a resistance to constitutional 
challenge surpassing that seen in any other context. 182 
Under the current statute, therefore, children of unmarried parents 
are not necessarily the children of their fathers for immigration purposes. 
The statutory criteria to establish a parent-child relationship between 
fathers and children born out of wedlock presents challenges that 
implicate issues of child custody. 
i. Child Custody and Legitimation 
In evaluating if a child is a "child" for immigration purposes via the 
legitimation prong, child custody is always at issue but rarely in a way 
that would not be satisfied with a broad range of child custody 
arrangements. The definition reaches a 
child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or 
under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or 
outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the 
child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal 
custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such 
legitimation. 183 
The term "legitimated" includes "those children who were illegitimate at 
birth, but who thereafter through legally recognized means attained the 
full legal status of legitimate children."184 
First, child custody may accompany a variety of acts and 
relationships that help establish legitimation under the laws of some 
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619,620 (1973). 
181. Bosniak, supra note 63, at 1097--98; accord Yick Wo v. Hopkins, II8 U.S. 356,369 (1886); see 
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("[W]e have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment 
protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal 
Government."); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896) (rejecting punishment of 
noncitizens without trial). 
182. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of the Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of 
aliens.") (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,339 (1909)); Matthews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79--80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and 
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); see 
also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) (upholding racially based deportation 
law directed at Chinese laborers). 
183. 8 U.S. C.§ IIOI(b)(1)(C) (2000). 
184. Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 782, 784-85 (B.I.A. 1994). 
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jurisdictions. Unless the residence and domicile of both the child and 
father are the same, the legitimation laws of multiple jurisdictions will be 
relevant.'85 The statutory use of the disjunctive clarifies that legitimation 
under any one applicable law suffices for immigration purposes and 
legitimation need not be established under the laws of all relevant 
jurisdictions. '86 This means that if a child is legitimated for immigration 
purposes in one jurisdiction, any argument that a particular custody 
ruling in ·family court is needed to establish legitimacy in another is 
overreaching. 
Requirements for legitimation vary greatly by jurisdiction and child 
custody is not relevant in many instances. At one end of the spectrum 
immigration law recognizes universal legitimation based on adoption of a 
law that sweepingly eliminates all legal distinctions between legitimate 
and illegitimate children.'87 At the other, "an illegitimate child cannot be 
made legitimate for general purposes" and thus under the laws of that 
jurisdiction cannot obtain the full legal status of legitimate children that 
immigration law requires.'88 In between are a bewildering variety of 
provisions'89 under which legitimation might be completed by simply 
acknowledging a child or establishing paternity'90 or by judicial 
proceedings resulting in formal declarations of legitimacy.'9' The 
requirements for legitimation in many jurisdictions include intermarriage 
of the natural parents, sometimes as the only possible avenue to 
I85. Id. 
I86. See 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(b)(I)(C) (2ooo); see also Matter of Martinez, I8 I. & N. Dec. 399 (B.I.A. 
I983)-
I87. Matter of Clahar, I81. & N. Dec. I (B.I.A. I98I) (regarding Jamaican law eliminating all legal 
distinctions based on birth in or out of wedlock). 
I88. In Indiana, for example, "[u)nder the present law, an illegitimate child cannot be made 
legitimate for general purposes, but may, if the proper prerequisites are met, be treated as legitimate 
for purposes of inheritance." J. ERIC SMITHBURN, I4 IND. PRACTICE SERIES§ 4· 13 (2006). 
189. In its Foreign Affairs Manual, the U.S. Department of State has created, yet rarely updates, a 
listing of some legitimation information by jurisdiction, foreign and domestic. See 7 U.S. DEP'T OF 
STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL§ I 133-4-2a (2007) [hereinafter FoREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL), available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86?57-Pdf. Unofficial compilations also exist. See 
DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CmZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK, app. 4-26 (20o6). 
190. See, e.g., In re Moraga, 231. & N. Dec. 195, I99 (B.I.A. 2001) (recognizing that in El Salvador 
a child is legitimated once paternity is established and overturning prior case law reaching opposite 
conclusion). 
I9I. In North Carolina, for instance, 
[t)he putative father of any child born out of wedlock, whether such father resides in North 
Carolina or not, may apply by a verified written petition, filed in a special proceeding in the 
superior court of the county in which the putative father resides or in the superior court of 
the county in which the child resides, praying that such child be declared legitimate. 
N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 49-ro (2005). 
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legitimation.'92 Some jurisdictions provide legitimation via actions that 
children can initiate, but the majority empower the father to legitimate 
or not without regard for the child's interests. 
Yet child custody remains a relevant consideration in every claim to 
establish a parent-child relationship for immigration purposes because 
the statute requires not only legitimation, but also that "the child is in the 
legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such 
legitimation."'93 This requirement, however, is easily met. 
According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, "where a child 
born out of wedlock has been properly legitimated, neither parent will be 
presumed to have a greater right than the other to the legal custody of 
that child."'94 Prior to this ruling, a father had to obtain a legal decree of 
custody prior to legitimation to establish that the child was in his custody 
at the moment of legitimation. Under the current understanding, "a 
father of an illegitimate child will no longer have to know in advance of 
[8 U.S.C. § nor(b)(r)(C)'s] legal custody requirement in order to satisfy 
that requirement."'95 At the time of legitimation, therefore, "[u]nless 
there is evidence to show that the father of a legitimated child has been 
deprived of his natural right to custody, he will be presumed to share 
custody with the mother, and to satisfy the legal custody requirement of 
(8 U.S.C. § IIOI(b)(r)(C)]."'96 
Unless there is formal action depriving a father of custody, the role 
of child custody in meeting the requirements for recognition as a "child" 
via legitimation becomes largely pro forma. The specific mention of legal 
custody in the definition makes for a facially tempting argument that 
children might not qualify in the absence of an assignment of custody to 
their fathers, but this collapses on closer scrutiny. 
More generally, legitimation litigation is most common after the fact, 
in trying to prove that legitimation took place at some time in the past. 
The U.S. Department of State advises its consular officers that 
192. Nebraska is one such jurisdiction. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1406 (2004). Interestingly, 
immigration regulations indicate that marriage of natural parents is sufficient, without regard to 
additional requirements for legitimation, such as acknowledgement, that many jurisdictions impose. 8 
C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(ii) (2007) ("A child can be legitimated through the marriage of his or her natural 
parents."). Of course, this avenue for legitimation excludes children of same sex partners. 
193. 8 U.S.C. § no1(b)(1)(C) (2ooo). 
194. Matter of Rivers, 17 I. & N. Dec. 419, 421 (B.I.A. 1980) (rejecting holding that legal custody 
would vest only by virtue of either a natural right or a court decree); see also 7 CHARLES GORDON ET 
AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 98.03(3)[f) (1997) (noting that "while the mother of a child 
born out of wedlock ordinarily is regarded as having legal custody, the father will be regarded as 
having equal right to legal custody at the time of legitimation"). 
195. Matter of Rivers, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 423. 
196. /d. 
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"[l)egitimation is best used to establish relationship only in cases where 
the legitimating act has already taken place and evidence is readily 
available."'97 Further, it cautions not to "inconvenience applicants by 
requiring them to submit extensive evidence of legitimation or expend 
resources to research or interpret foreign legitimation laws."'98 Moreover, 
in immigration law proving "a child legitimate or legitimated generally 
benefits the child for purposes of preference classification,"'99 so it is 
ironic that in the citizenship context this same "determination that 
accords a benefit in visa petition proceedings may become a 
detriment."2()() Given the complexity and potential harm, establishing 
compliance with the "child" definition via legitimacy generally is not the 
first, best option. Especially if a child is under age eighteen, the cutoff 
age for legitimation to count, there usually are easier ways to establish a 
parent-child relationship for purposes of immigration law. 
ii. Child Custody and Bona Fide Parent-Child 
Relationships 
Instead of establishing legitimation, a "purported father of a child or 
son or daughter born out of wedlock" who seeks to petition for his child, 
can "show that he is the natural father and that a bona fide parent-child 
relationship was established when the child or son or daughter was 
unmarried and under twenty-one years of age."201 Meeting this is not 
particularly onerous, though it does require "more than merely a 
biological relationship."202 By regulation, a bona fide parent-child 
relationship "will be deemed to exist or to have existed where the father 
demonstrates or has demonstrated an active concern for the child's 
support, instruction, and general welfare."203 
Establishing a bona fide relationship thus does not require a formal 
finding of legal custody or any particular allocation of parenting 
responsibilities. The requirement can be met by evidence of"[ e ]motional 
and/or financial ties or a genuine concern and interest by the father." 2 " 4 
I97- FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note I89, § I I33·4·2(4)(a)(v) (2007). 
I98. !d. The Adjudicator's Field Manual for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services warns its 
officers, who generally are not attorneys, that "[y]ou may also consult the Foreign Affairs Manual or 
inquire with the Library of Congress if there are questions that still need to be resolved regarding the 
legitimation requirements of a particular country." U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL-REDACfED PUBLIC VERSION § 71.I(d)(2) (2007) [hereinafter FIELD 
MANUAL], http:l/www .uscis.gov/propub/Doc View/afmid/r #o-o-0-350 (follow "7 1. I" hyperlink ). 
I99· In re Rowe, 23 I. & N. Dec. 962, 965 (B.I.A. 2006). 
200. /d. 
201. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iii) (2007). 
202. /d. 
203- /d. 
204- /d. 
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Given the reality that many immigration petitions involve years of 
backlogs and family separation, immigration regulations specifically 
acknowledge the possibility that the children and the father might have 
never "actually lived together" and provide that where they did not live 
together there simply should be evidence that "the father held the child 
out as his own, that he provided for some or all of the child's needs, or 
that in general the father's behavior evidenced a genuine concern for the 
child."205 
Immigration law's dominant view of children as dependents and 
potential public charges is evident in the details of possible ways to 
demonstrate genuine concern, including but not limited to "money order 
receipts or cancelled checks showing the father's financial support of the 
beneficiary [child]; the father's income tax returns; [and] the father's 
medical or insurance records which include the beneficiary as a 
dependent."2<J6 Other evidence might include "school records for the 
beneficiary; correspondence between the parties; or notarized affidavits 
of friends, neighbors, school officials, or other associates knowledgeable 
about the relationship."207 
A family court order establishing the father's custody would be 
relevant to establishing a parent-child relationship but it is not necessary. 
At the same time, if establishing a parent-child relationship benefits the 
child, without regard to child custody, a family court determining the 
custody of a child certainly could exercise its equitable powers to require 
financial support and other indicia of a bona fide parent-child 
relationship. 
b. Child Custody and Stepparents 
Surprisingly, given the complexity of establishing a parent-child 
relationship for fathers generally, immigration law recognizes a stepchild 
as a "child" for immigration purposes quite readily, as long as the child 
has "not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage 
creating the status of stepchild occurred."2o8 Ironically, the bar is much 
lower to establish a stepparent-child relationship under immigration law 
than it is to establish a parent-child relationship.2<'9 Evidentiary 
requirements to establish a stepchild relationship include only the birth 
certificate of the stepchild naming the biological parent, the marriage 
certificate of biological parent and stepparent, and evidence of 
205. /d. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. 
208. 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(b)(1)(8) (2000). 
209. As will be discussed below, however, a stepparent relationship is not recognized for 
citizenship purposes. See id. § 1 IOI(c)(I); see also infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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termination of any previous marriages of the parents."o 
Relying on the simple language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit 
firmly rejected a government attempt to require that a stepparent have 
an "active parental interest" or show that that stepparent and stepchild 
be part of a "close family unit.""' Therefore, without regard to the nature 
of the relationship, "persons who become stepchildren through the 
marriage of a natural parent prior to their eighteenth birthday are 
entitled to visa preference as a class under section 101 (b)( 1 )(B) without 
further qualification."212 Thus, a child's custody has no impact on 
qualifying as a "child" of the natural parent's spouse for immigration 
purposes as a stepchild. Any immigration petition that the natural parent 
could file on behalf of the child could then be filed by the stepparent 
without regard to the existence of any real relationship."3 
A stepparent relationship normally ceases upon divorce of the 
natural parent and stepparent."4 However, "under certain circumstances 
a step relationship may continue after the death of the natural parent or 
even after the legal separation or divorce of the stepparent and natural 
parent if there is an ongoing relationship between the stepparent and 
stepchild."2 ' 5 In such instances, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a 
family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the 
stepparent and stepchild.""6 "If the marriage ends in annulment, 
however, the step relationship is deemed to have never existed because 
legally the marriage never existed.""7 If a child's immigration status is 
reliant on a stepparent, these considerations might have bearing on 
family court proceedings regarding the dissolution of the marriage even 
though no particular custody arrangement is required. 
c. Child Custody and Adopted Children 
Immigration law has always been skeptical of adoption. The first 
210. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iv) (2007). This is, of course, "assuming that the marriage is not a 
sham or does not violate the Defense of Marriage Act." FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, 
§ 21.4(d)(2)(A) (2007); see also Matter of Awwal, 19 I. & N. Dec. 617, 621-22 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding 
that even where there is an ongoing actual family relationship between stepparent and child, the 
relationship cannot be recognized where the marriage creating the step-relationship was a sham). 
211. Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 198o); accord Matter of McMillan, 17 I. & N. 
Dec. 6os, 6o6 (B.I.A. 1981) (extending the Ninth Circuit rule nationwide). 
212. McMillan, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 6o6. 
213. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21.4(d)(2)(B) (2007) ("The creation of a step relationship in 
no way terminates the relationship between the child and his or her other natural parent (i.e., the one 
who did not marry the stepparent)."). The child may later in life petition for the natural parent, but 
the child cannot do so until reaching age twenty-one. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
214. Matter of Simicevic, 10 I. & N. Dec. 363, 364-{)5 (B.I.A. 1963). 
215. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21.4(d)(2)(B) (2007). 
216. Matter of Mourillon, 18 I. & N. Dec. 122, 125 (B. I.A. 1981). 
217. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21.4(d)(2)(B) (2007). 
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statutory definition of the term "child" in immigration law was in the 
negative, proclaiming only that "[t]he terms 'child,' 'father,' and 
'mother,' do not include a child or parent by adoption."218 Similarly, the 
first attempt at a positive statutory definition of child, the original 
version of today's definition, did not include adopted children.219 Not 
until 1957 was the possibility of an adopted child becoming a "child" for 
immigration purposes incorporated into immigration laW.220 
Today's statute contains two separate provisions delineating when 
adopted children can be recognized as children for immigration 
purposeS. 221 One of these is aimed at "orphans" who have "been adopted 
abroad" and is the provision that covers most overseas adoptions. 222 This 
provision only applies to U.S. citizen parents who are eligible to bring the 
adopted child to the United States without years of backlog in the 
immigration procesS.223 Immigration of the child to the United States 
through this provision follows an extensive pre-adoption qualification 
process and subsequent child custody determinations are not normally 
relevant for immigration law purposes because arranging a visa for the 
child is part of this process. Further, when children arrive as permanent 
residents under this provision they generally will become U.S. citizens 
upon arrival, as discussed below. 
In contrast, child custody plays an express and central role in 
establishing a parent-child relationship under other adoption provisions. 
This portion of the statutory definition of child reaches a "child adopted 
while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal 
custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at 
least two years."224 This provision applies without regard to place. It 
provides an avenue to establish a parent-child relationship for 
218. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. rgo, § 28, Pub. L. No. 68-139,43 Stat. 153, 169 (1924); see Matter 
of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (B.I.A. 1953). 
219. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 171 (1952); see Matter of 
Repuyan, 191. & N. Dec. II9, 121-22 (B.I.A. 1984) ("Adoptees were not included as children in the 
1952 revision of the immigration laws, despite a recommendation to do so by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee."). 
220. Act of Sept. n, 1957, § 2, Pub. L. No. 85-316,71 STAT. 639,639 (1957). 
221. As noted above, a third is pending entry into force of the Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. See supra note 156. 
222. 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(b)(r)(F) (2000). 
223. The definition reaches a "child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his 
behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section r 151(b) of this title." !d. The 
referenced petition is an immediate relative petition that only a U.S. citizen can make. See Mareno-
Morante v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d II72 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the impossibility of establishing a parent-
child relationship between an unauthorized-immigrant adopting parent and adopted U.S.-citizen 
children who cannot file such a petition). 
224. 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(b)(r)(E) (2000). 
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immigration purposes for children already here in the United States who 
cannot meet the "adopted abroad" criteria of the other adoption 
provision. It also applies to children adopted abroad. As such, both the 
legal custody and residence requirements may be implicated in child 
custody determinations. 
For purposes of this provision, "legal custody" is defined to mean 
"the assumption of responsibility for a minor by an adult under the laws 
of the state and under the order or approval of a court of law or other 
appropriate government entity."225 In contrast to the easy assumption of 
custody discussed in the legitimation context, informal care 
arrangements are insufficient here, and "[t]his provision requires that a 
legal process involving the courts or other recognized government entity 
take place."226 The adoption decree may be satisfactory to establish 
custody, though other determinations of custody may have relevance 
given that "[l]egal custody and residence occurring prior to or after the 
adoption will satisfy both requirements."227 The duration of both legal 
custody and residence is "accounted for in the aggregate. Therefore, a 
break in legal custody or residence will not affect the time already 
fulfilled." 228 The child must be under age sixteen at the time the adoption 
is finalized, but the duration of legal custody and residence requirements 
can be met later. 
The residence requirement "implies that the child resides in a home 
established by the adopting parent."229 This means that "mere periodic 
visits by an adopting parent in the home of the child do not satisfy the 
residence requirement. "230 Although residence is accumulated in the 
aggregate, the time that counts is the child's time in the parent's home, 
not the parent's time in the child's home elsewhere. 
Moreover, the residence requirement can require "more than simply 
that the adopted child and adoptive parent live together in the same 
residence for 2 years."23 ' To avoid the conclusion that an adoption is a 
sham, when an "adopted child continues to reside in the same household 
with the natural parent or parents ... the petitioner has the burden of 
establishing that the adoptive parent exercised primary parental control 
225. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(vii)(A) (2007). 
226. /d. 
227. /d.§ 204.2(d)(2)(vii)(C). 
228. !d.; see also Matter of M, 8 I. & N. Dec. 118 (B.l.A. 1958). 
229. Matter of Repuyan, 191. & N. Dec. 119, 12o-2I (B.l.A. 1984); accord Moge v. Morris, 470 F. 
Supp. 556, 559 (D.C. Pa. 1979) (noting that an "adoption is not recognized as valid for the purposes of 
the immigration laws [where] the children are not residing with the adoptive parents"). 
230. Repuyan, 191. & N. Dec. at 121. 
231. Matter of Marquez, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16o, 164 (B.I.A. 1990). 
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during the period of residence."'3' 
Until this point, child custody's role in establishing a parent-child 
relationship has been relevant, but hardly of great significance. In the 
context of adopted children, however, it takes on real importance. The 
legal formalities of establishing custody matter, as do living 
arrangements. More analysis of this distinction will follow, but first it is 
important to discuss the treatment of children and child custody in 
citizenship law. 
c. CHILD CUSTODY IN CITIZENSHIP 
As noted at the outset of this exploration of immigration and 
nationality law, the statutory framework for determining who is or may 
become a U.S. citizen is distinct from, though interrelated with, 
immigration laws governing the admission and removal of immigrants.'33 
Eschewing consistency, the Immigration and Nationality Act introduces 
a new definition of "child" for its citizenship laws: 
The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years 
of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's 
residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or 
domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere, and, except as 
otherwise provided in sections 1431 and 1432 of this title, a child 
adopted in the United States, if such legitimation or adoption takes 
place before the child reaches the age of r6 years (except to the extent 
that the child is described in subparagraph (E)(ii) or (F)(ii) of 
subsection (b)( r) of this section), and the child is in the legal custody of 
the legitimating or adopting parent or parents at the time of such 
legitimation or adoption.'34 
Much here is familiar, though several distinctions between this definition 
and that of immigration law are worth noting. 
First, two avenues that are available to establish parent-child 
relationships under immigration law are missing here. Citizenship law 
does not recognize a "child" on the basis of a stepparent relationship or 
via demonstrating a bona fide parent-child relationship. The absence of 
these avenues, as will be discussed below, perhaps is somewhat mitigated 
at points by citizenship law's occasional use of the term "person" instead 
232. Matter of Cuello, 20 I. & N. Dec. 94, 97 (B.I.A. 1989); accord 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(vii)(B) 
(2007) ("When the adopted child continued to reside in the same household as the natural parent(s) 
during the period in which the adoptive parent petitioner seeks to establish his or her compliance with 
this requirement, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that he or she exercised primary 
parental control during that period of residence."). 
233. Citizenship laws are set out primarily in Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 
codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1504 (2000). 
234· Jd. § II01(c)(1). 
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of "child," reducing the importance of qualifying as a child in some 
contexts. 
Second, the requirements for establishing a parent-child relationship 
via legitimation are similar to those in the immigration definition, with 
the slightly different age requirement that legitimation occur before the 
child reaches age sixteen. The requirement of legal custody at the time of 
legitimation tracks the language found in the immigration definition. 
Third, the adoption portion of the definition contains the same age 
limit of sixteen years, but does not include the requirement of two years 
of legal custody and residence found in the immigration definition. 
Instead, it requires legal custody at the time of adoption, mirroring the 
legitimacy provision, without specifying any particular duration. Also, 
this definition reaches only "a child adopted in the United States," so 
that children adopted abroad are not children for citizenship purposes. 
They still qualify for certain citizenship benefits, however, through a 
statutory fix that will be discussed below. 
With these distinctions in hand, it is time to explore the role of child 
custody in three avenues to U.S. citizenship: birth in the United States, 
acquisition at birth, and derivation. 
I. Child Custody and Jus Soli Citizenship 
The most common method of attaining citizenship, through birth 
within the United States or jus soli citizenship, is not affected by child 
custody determinations. "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside."235 In r884, Native 
Americans born within the United States but within tribal authority were 
adjudicated "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus 
did not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'36 The Court later identified the only other persons falling 
outside the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause as "children born of alien 
enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives 
of a foreign State."237 The constitutional mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment now is incorporated into statute and regulation, with the 
explanation that "[a] child born in the United States is born subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States and is a United States citizen if the 
parent is not a 'foreign diplomatic officer. "'238 Calls for reinterpretation 
235. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ r. 
236. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). U.S. citizenship at birth is now conferred to affected 
Native Americans by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000). 
237. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,682 (1898). 
238. 8 C.F.R. § IIOI.3(b) (2007);seealso 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000). 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, or for statutory and constitutional 
amendment, "to restrict the acquisition of citizenship by the children of 
undocumented immigrants are often advanced, but none have gained 
sufficient support to have any realistic chance of enactment."239 In the 
meantime, more than a century of settled interpretation and 
understanding leaves no doubt about the citizenship of children born in 
the United States. 
Unless their parents are diplomatic officers recognized as such by 
the United States, all children born in the United States are U.S. citizens 
without regard to the citizenship or immigration status of their parents 
and without regard to whether they are in the custody of a U.S. citizen 
parent.24° Citizenship adheres at birth and subsequent decisions regarding 
child custody will not alter the child's citizenship.241 
2. Child Custody and Acquisition of Citizenship at Birth 
By statute, citizenship also is extended to certain children born 
outside the United States to parents who are U.S. citizens at the time of 
the child's birth. 242 This is generally referred to as "acquisition" of 
citizenship at birth. To acquire citizenship at birth, generally at least one 
parent must have been a U.S. citizen at the time of the child's birth and 
have been physically present in the United States for a requisite period 
of time at some point prior to the birth.243 Child custody potentially plays 
a role in acquisition because the law employs a distinction between 
children born in wedlock and those not, similar to that discussed in the 
immigration context above.244 
Though acquisition of citizenship takes place at birth, certain actions 
239· Thronson, supra note 50, at 83; see a/so MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CRS REPORT FOR CoNGRESS ORDER CoDE: U.S. CmZENSHIP OF PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
ALIEN PARENTS Io-I8 (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33079-20050913.pdf; 
Brooke Kirkland, Note, Limiting the Application of Jus Soli: The Resulting Status of Undocumented 
Children in the United States, 12 BuFF. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 197, 197--99 (2006) (describing proposals to 
limit jus soli citizenship). 
240. Children born in the United States to diplomats generally are accorded permanent residence 
status. See 8 C.F.R. § 101.3 (2007). 
241. See Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, II 
(1997) ("United States citizenship, once acquired, is virtually impossible to lose without the citizen's 
express consent."). 
242. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2000). 
243. See id. § 1401(c)-(g). Because acquisition of citizenship occurs only at birth, its provisions are 
not applicable for adopted children in relation to an adoptive U.S. citizen parent. 
244. See supra notes 16o, 170-75 and accompanying text. The relevant statutory section for 
children born out of wedlock is 8 U.S.C. § 1409 and "applies to all persons born on or after November 
14, 1986, its effective date and ... to persons who had not attained age 18 as of November 14, 1986, 
except those who had previously been legitimated, to whom 'old' [8 U.S.C. § 1409] applies." FoREIGN 
AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 189, § II33·4·2(a)(I) (1998). 
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are required to prove and retain the U.S. citizenship so acquired. This 
hopefully happens early, though it may be delayed, and age limits for 
some of the requirements place the process on a clock. In order for 
persons'45 born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen father to establish that 
they acquired citizenship at birth, among the elements they must 
demonstrate are that "the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing 
to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the 
age of 18 years,"'46 and 
while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's 
residence or domicile, 
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing or 
under oath, or 
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a 
competent court. '47 
These are not particularly onerous requirements, though satisfaction 
requires action on the part of the father and a child cannot meet these 
without the father's participation. 
Awareness is essential to formal compliance with these 
requirements, because it is unlikely for a father to "satisfy [these 
requirements] incidentally without knowledge of the law."'48 For 
example, that "the father actually provide financial support is not 
enough; he must agree in writing to do so."'49 Moreover, the 
requirements must be met prior to the child reaching age eighteen.'50 The 
result is that the father's pledge of financial support is absolutely 
required even though it might be essentially meaningless if entered as the 
child nears age eighteen.'5' Even where the agreement is executed while 
the child is young, if a father "subsequently fails to support the child, the 
245. Using the term "person" instead of "child" might indicate that any limitations on the parent-
child relationship inherent in the citizenship definition of child and not specifically required in this 
section are irrelevant. Still, the term "father" is used and is defined solely in relation to the definition 
of child. See 8 U.S.C. §I IOI(c)(2) (2ooo). 
246. /d. § I409(a)(3). 
247. /d. § I409(a)(4). 
248. David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 333 (2005). 
249. !d. at 333-34· 
250. /d. at 334 n.89 (noting that the "text of [8 U.S.C. § I409] does not explicitly require that the 
promise be made before the child turns eighteen at all, though the State Department's Foreign Affairs 
Manual rules out the possibility of a father signing a meaningless lapsed promise after that time"); see 
a/so FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note I89, § II33·4·2.b(3)(c)(v) (I998). 
251. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note I89, § 1133-4·2.b(3)(c)(v) (I998) (stating that 
agreement must be dated any time prior to child's eighteenth birthday). 
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child's U.S. citizenship is not taken away."252 
Legitimation, with its occasional requirements involving child 
custody, may be a part of demonstrating acquisition of citizenship. But 
with some awareness of the requirements, the quirky requirements of 
legitimation are avoidable and acquisition likely is much more easily 
obtained through the other options of acknowledging or adjudicating 
paternity. Family court judges or attorneys could make an important 
contribution to a child's interests in a qualifying case by recognizing the 
need for and benefit from a written agreement and formal adjudication 
of paternity in a custody dispute. 253 Moreover, if an agreement such as 
§ 1409 contemplates has been executed, it may have relevance regarding 
child support matters.254 
J. Child Custody and Derivation of Citizenship 
Persons not born as U.S. citizens may qualify to naturalize as citizens 
after obtaining and holding permanent resident status for a requisite 
number of years, generally five, and meeting a host of other 
requirements, including being at least eighteen years of age. 255 Although 
children are prohibited from naturalizing on their own, under certain 
circumstances children may "derive" U.S. citizenship from a parent's 
naturalization.256 The distinction between acquisition and derivation is 
that acquisition involves a parent who was a U.S. citizen at the time of 
the child's birth, and derivation involves a parent who was not a citizen at 
the time of birth but later naturalizes. 
Derivation of citizenship statutes have changed over time and it is 
important to look at the relevant effective dates of statutory provisions. 
For older children and adults, prior versions of derivation statutes may 
be applicable. Enacted as the Child Citizen Act of 2000,257 the current 
statute provides: 
A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a 
citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have 
been fulfilled: 
252. !d. § II33·4·2.b(3)(e) (noting that while the Department of State "has no authority to obtain 
payments pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § I409(a)) ... [t)his does not mean ... that it could not be enforced by 
the child against the father, or pursuant to laws administered by other government entities"). 
253. See, e.g., Recommendations, supra note 97 ("In juvenile justice and child welfare proceedings, 
children's attorneys should understand the interconnections to other related substantive areas, such as 
health, housing, public benefits, education, domestic violence, immigration, and transnational 
issues."). 
254. See Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at I70Q-0"] (discussing affidavits of support 
executed in the context of immigration based on marriage). 
255. See 8 U.S.C. § I42I (2000). 
256. See id. §§ I43 I, I433· 
257. See Child Citizen Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, I I4 Stat. I63I (2000). 
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(r) At least one parent of the child is a crhzen of the United 
States, whether by birth or naturalization. 
(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years. 
(3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and 
physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful 
admission for permanent residence.'58 
sor 
Moreover, this section "shall apply to a child adopted by a United 
States citizen parent if the child satisfies the requirements applicable to 
adopted children under section IIOI(b)(I)."'59 This extends the provision 
to cover many children adopted abroad who are not included in the 
citizenship definition of "child."'oo The statute put in place by the Child 
Citizenship Act represented a major revision, shifting from a general 
requirement that both parents naturalize to a requirement of only one 
parent and thus significantly liberalizing derivation. The "key to the 
[passage of the Child Citizenship Act] was the notion that foreign-born 
adopted children should be granted United States citizenship as 
efficiently as possible as a way to establish parity between adopted and 
biological children and to eliminate the possibility of deportation in the 
future. "'61 
For children of parents who are successful in navigating through the 
immigration and naturalization system, this statute provides a potentially 
quick route to citizenship. To be sure, the children must first become 
permanent residents.'6' But if the other requirements are met, the 
children of U.S. citizens, including those just arriving after an adoption 
abroad, become U.S. citizens the instant those children become 
permanent residents. 
One of those other requirements is that the "child is residing in the 
United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent."'63 
There is a glut of litigation regarding legitimation and legal custody in 
the derivation-of-citizenship context. In contrast to most all of 
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2ooo). 
259· fd. § 1431(b). 
260. Seeid. § uor(c)(r). 
261. Victor C. Romero, The Child Citizenship Act and the Family Reunification Act: Valuing the 
Citizen Child as Well as the Citizen Parent, 55 FLA. L. REv. 489, 5oo--o1 (2003) ("Most adults wanting to 
adopt in the United States are white, and most children waiting to be adopted, both domestically and 
internationally, are nonwhite. Thus, many adoptive American families are likely to be ones in which 
the parents are white and the adopted children are nonwhite. Viewed from this perspective, it is easy 
to see why the [Child Citizenship Act] was so positively received. Many of the white senators and 
representatives easily identified with the white United States citizen parents who wanted to make sure 
their nonwhite adopted children were United States citizens."). 
262. See 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3) (2ooo); see also 7 GORDON ET AL., supra note 125. 
263. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3). 
502 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59=453 
immigration and nationality law, when all the various requirements to 
derive citizenship are met, the derivation is complete automatically 
without the need for formal adjudication and without regard to whether 
the person who derived citizenship is aware of the derivation.264 This 
leaves much room for ex post facto litigation, often by persons facing 
removal for criminal conduct who attempt to defeat removal by 
establishing that they actually are U.S. citizens. With cases frequently 
arising in this not particularly sympathetic posture, and involving facts 
from years or decades in the past, a predictable lack of generosity 
generally reigns in the interpretation of derivation statutes. 
Most current litigation is related to the version of this statute that 
preceded the Child Citizenship Act, affecting persons who reached age 
eighteen before February 27, 2001. Under this prior relevant statutory 
provision, derivation of citizenship required the naturalization of both 
parents or the "naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the 
child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the 
naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the 
paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation. "265 
Without delving too deeply, a brief review of these lines of cases gives 
some insight into how child custody has been interpreted in the 
derivation-of-citizenship context. Some issues are potentially resolved by 
the current statute, though some may carry forward. 
a. Legitimation Revisited 
Turning first to children born out of wedlock, a person seeking to 
establish derivation of citizenship under the prior statute based on a 
mother's naturalization often has the strange goal of proving that 
legitimation did not take place because under the prior law "a child 
whose paternity has not been established by legitimation before the age 
of sixteen may derive citizenship through the mother. "266 If legitimation 
occurred, then the naturalization of both parents would be required to 
establish derivation. 267 
264. For example, Duarnis Saul Perez was deported in 1996 based on a criminal conviction and 
then arrested "as he attempted to return to the United States. He pleaded guilty to one count of illegal 
reentry after removal" and "served his entire 57-month sentence before discovering he is an American 
[citizen] and therefore could not be an illegal alien." John Caher, Government Opposes Habeas for 
'Innocent' Man, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 2006, at I. However, "citizenship was automatically conferred on 
Mr. Perez in rg88, when his mother became a U.S. citizen. Even his mother was not aware of her son's 
citizenship, and, in fact, advised both Mr. Perez and his attorneys that the man was not an American." 
!d. 
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) (1994) (repealed 2000). 
266. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 7LI{d){3) (2007). 
267. See In re Rowe, 23 L & N. Dec. 962, 967 (B.LA. 2oo6) ("Because the respondent's parents 
never married, we agree that his paternity was not established through legitimation. Consequently, we 
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Given that legitimacy may be established by operation of a general 
law eliminating distinctions between children born in and out of 
wedlock,268 children inay be deemed legitimate even if they have no 
relationship with their father, and this can bar derivation based on the 
mother's naturalization alone. For example, a man "was born out of 
wedlock in El Salvador, and his father acknowledged paternity on the 
respondent's birth certificate. [He is] considered a legitimated child 
under El Salvadoran law. Without proof that his father is deceased, the 
respondent cannot establish derivative citizenship through the 1986 
naturalization of his mother."269 
The current statute's requirement of only one parent naturalizing 
should remove the need to argue against legitimacy for children who are 
covered by it. There will be, however, persons born out of wedlock who 
will wish to establish legitimation to derive citizenship under the current 
statute based on the naturalization of their fathers. Because the 
citizenship definition of "child" does not include many avenues to 
establish a parent-child relationship, legitimation may be the only 
available route. 
b. Legal Custody and Separation 
The second area of litigation has involved the prior statute's grant of 
derivative citizenship upon the naturalization of "the parent having legal 
custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the 
parents."27° First, if there has been no marriage there is no legal 
separation and the case is back in the realm discussed in the previous 
section. This statutory language has prompted questions about when a 
child is in a parent's legal custody in the wake of vague language or 
silence regarding child custody in family court decrees dissolving 
marriages. Courts have tended to look "to state law to decide who has 
legal custody of a minor for derivative citizenship purposes"271 or to look 
for a "judicial determination" and if none is found then "the parent in 
'actual uncontested custody' is deemed to have legal custody."272 Either 
of these approaches cautions advocates and family courts to seek clarity 
in decisions regarding child custody to avoid needless litigation and 
hold that the respondent derived United States citizenship under former section 321(a)(3) upon the 
naturalization of his mother."). 
268. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
269. In re Landaverry-Avelar, File No. A42 475 573, 2006 WL 3922208, at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 
2006). 
270. 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (1994) (repealed 2000). 
271. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bagot, the custody order at issue was a 
two-page form order on which the father's name was typed into the space before the preprinted words 
"shall have custody of the children" on the form. !d. at 254. 
272. Bagot, 398 F. 3d at 259. 
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unintended results. 
By regulatory definition in this context, "[l]egal custody refers to the 
responsibility for and authority over a child."273 Further, 
[j]oint custody, in the case of a child of divorced or legally separated 
parents, means the award of equal responsibility for and authority over 
the care, education, religion, medical treatment, and general welfare of 
a child to both parents by a court of law or other appropriate 
government entity pursuant to the laws of the state or country of 
residence. 274 
Under prior law, an award of sole or joint custody can matter, as 
demonstrated in the next section. 
c. Sole Custody and Joint Custody 
Recently, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a derivative citizenship claim 
involving a divorce decree that awarded a "mother 'sole physical 
custody' of Petitioner, but awarded both . . . parents 'joint legal 
custody."'275 The court held that 
§ 1432(a)(3)'s requirement that 'the parent having legal custody of the 
child' be a naturalized citizen of the United States is satisfied only 
when but one of two living and legally separated parents is a 
naturalized U.S. citizen and that parent is vested with the sole legal 
custody of the child. 276 
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed enormous emphasis on the 
use of "the singular form of 'parent"' in allowing a child to derive 
citizenship from the naturalization of "'the parent having legal custody of 
the child. "'m If, said the court, Congress had intended that the 
"requirements could be met when two legally separated parents shared 
joint legal custody of a child and only one of those two parents was 
naturalized, it could have used more inclusive language to signify as 
much."278 
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit adopted a decidedly 
parent-centered approach, asserting that "Congress meant ... to protect 
the rights of both parents for as long as each one of them has legal rights 
over the child."279 "'It makes sense ... that when the child's parents are 
still married, the child does not automatically acquire a new citizenship 
273. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2007). 
274· /d. 
275. Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 388, 390 (sth Cir. 2006). 
276. !d. at 398. 
277. See id. at]96. 
278. /d. 
279. !d. at 397· 
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upon the naturalization of only one parent."''8o Only with sole custody in 
one parent established "could the federal courts be confident that the 
non-custodial, non-naturalized parent truly has no rights over the 
child."'8• The Fifth Circuit drew support from the Ninth Circuit which 
stated: 
[W]e think that Congress generally intended to provide automatic 
citizenship to children born abroad of alien parents only after the 
naturalization of both biological parents. This policy is rational for at 
least a few reasons, but we need only discuss one rationale here: the 
protection of parental rights. If United States citizenship were 
conferred to a child where one parent naturalized, but the other parent 
remained an alien, the alien's parental rights could be effectively 
extinguished .... Thus, [former 8 U.S.C. § 1432] prevents the 
naturalizing parent from usurping the parental rights of the alien 
parent.'8' 
First, this reasoning relies on an effort to inaccurately conflate a 
parent's citizen status with parental rights. There is simply no reason to 
think that by granting U.S. citizenship the "alien's parental rights could 
be effectively extinguished." As discussed above, noncitizen parents have 
equal parental rights without regard to the status of themselves and that 
of their children.'83 If the court's logic were correct, there would be cause 
for grave concern now that the current statute accomplishes derivation 
based on the naturalization of one parent. 
Second, although the current statute permits derivation when "[a]t 
least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States"'84 it uses the 
same language of the prior statute that the child still must reside "in the 
United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent."'85 
The limiting "when there has been a legal separation of the parents" 
language of the old statute is gone, so an interpretation of the same 
singular "the" that so impressed the Bustamante court in the same way 
would require sole custody before derivation could be complete. This 
would mean that children of an intact couple with shared custody of their 
children could not derive citizenship on the basis of one parent's 
naturalization. Such an interpretation would undermine the reform most 
central to the Child Citizenship Act. 
To date, the government has agreed that sole custody is not required 
280. /d. (quoting Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415,425-26 (5th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original). 
281. /d. at 398. 
282. Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F. 3d 1062, ro66 (9th Cir. 2003). 
283. See supra notes 64--69 and accompanying text. 
284. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1) (2000). 
285. /d. § 1431(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
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under the current statute and for children living with both parents, with a 
surviving parent or with a legitimating parent, with regard to the legal 
custody requirement, "the [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services] 
will presume that a U.S. citizen parent has 'legal custody' of a child ... 
absent evidence to the contrary."'86 A "child born out of wedlock who 
has not been legitimated may acquire citizenship through his or her 
naturalizing mother. "'87 The Code of Federal Regulations states: 
In the case of a child of divorced or legally separated parents, [U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services] will find a U.S. citizen parent to 
have legal custody of a child, for the purpose of the [Child Citizenship 
Act], where there has been an award of primary care, control and 
maintenance of a minor to a parent by a court of law or other 
appropriate government entity.'88 
Additionally, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services "will consider a 
U.S. citizen parent who has been awarded 'joint custody' to have legal 
custody of a child."'89 
Child custody remains highly relevant in the citizenship context. It 
also is important to note that the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 
introduced the term "physical custody" into the mix for the first time 
with no mention of the reason for this in the legislative record. There has 
yet been no attempt to define "physical custody" by regulation or judicial 
opinion, and it has largely been assumed to be coextensive with residence 
as used in the adoption context discussed above. 
D. REVEALING VALUES 
Tracing the role of child custody through immigration and 
nationality provides insights into the nature and values expressed in 
immigration law's treatment of children. It reveals a system 
fundamentally at odds with the child-centered values of family law. 
Families are organized around parents and their interests, children are 
denied agency, and designation as children is expressly reserved for 
some, but not all, children. The parent-centered nature of immigration 
law fails to acknowledge the central role of children as organizing forces 
in families with their own needs and interests. 
Even on its own terms, the crazy conglomeration of provisions that 
determine who is a "child" for immigration law purposes and the erratic 
role of child custody in this determination are open to criticism. Sheer 
complexity alone makes the system difficult to administer and creates 
286. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1(1) (2007). 
287. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK§ 22:19 (1998). 
288. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1(2) (2007). 
289. ld. 
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meaningless traps for the unwary and misinformed. Immigration law's 
inconsistent requirements create an uneven playing field that lacks 
reasoned justification for its disparate treatment of children and families. 
Further, immigration and nationality law's requirements 
demonstrate unprincipled variation. For just a few examples, "legal 
custody" is expressly required only for adopted and legitimated children, 
and the lengthy two-year period for adoption is not matched in the 
legitimacy provision, which is silent on the required duration of legal 
custody. Only certain adopted children are expressly required to reside 
with a parent. Without rational distinction, becoming a "child" by 
adoption must be accomplished before age sixteen, becoming a "child" 
as a stepchild or via legitimation must happen before age eighteen, and 
becoming a "child" through the other provisions must occur before age 
twenty-one unless interpretation is reliant on some state or foreign law 
that incorporates an earlier deadline. Cobbled together over decades, the 
definition of "child" is central to children's access to the primary avenue 
of immigration yet lacks coherent logic in the rigid distinctions it draws. 
By making distinctions based on legitimacy, and then looking to the 
laws of multiple jurisdictions to determine legitimacy, immigration and 
nationality law maintain a distinction rejected elsewhere in the law and 
incorporate a constantly shifting and amorphous body of law which is 
unnecessarily difficult to ascertain and apply. The result is not just 
complexity and extensive litigation, but a marked variation in outcome 
for identically situated people in different jurisdictions. Whether children 
arrive or are excluded, stay or are removed, can turn on whether they 
live in Indiana or Ohio. Immigration and citizenship status may turn 
solely on the effective date of foreign legislation in a country that the 
children left years ago that eliminates legal distinctions between 
legitimate and illegitimate children. This approach allows critical 
determinations to turn on laws whose underlying assumptions and values 
may not be shared. Immigration and nationality law embrace 
meaningless distinctions that are not grounded in principle or logic. 
The perpetuation of this unprincipled system is at least partially a 
result of the exceptionalism of immigration law and the notion that 
immigration law is different with different rules. Exploring the ways in 
which immigration law functions as family law can provide insights and 
perspective that reveal the manner in which immigration law is less 
removed and distinct than it sometimes seems. 
III. FROM BoTH SIDES Now 
Having now examined the potential for use of immigration status in 
child custody matters and traced the role of child custody through 
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immigration law, it is obvious that there is massive oversimplification in 
the traditional notion that family law is the exclusive province of the 
states while immigration law is entirely federal. Without trying to define 
the full contours of family law, it certainly includes law that regulates the 
relationship between children and their parents.'90 Similarly, whatever 
the outer boundaries of immigration and nationality law, it certainly 
encompasses determinations of who is eligible for authorized 
immigration status and citizenship in the United States.29 ' 
As it makes judgments that reveal the boundaries of children's 
access to family-sponsored immigration and thus determines which 
family members are accorded permission to live within the United States, 
immigration law is family law. 292 By deciding whether a particular 
relationship between a child and parent is worthy of recognition and 
assigning this relevance in immigration law, immigration law regulates 
basic family decisions such as where and with whom children will live. It 
influences private family decisions and behavior as parents and children 
conform their actions to qualifications set forth in immigration law. 
Immigration law also operates indirectly as family law when its 
conclusions are allowed to influence or determine the outcome of child 
custody matters in family courts. At the same time, family law functions 
as immigration law when its conclusions are determinative of 
immigration rights, when its decisions are manipulated to facilitate 
immigration outcomes, or simply when its placement decisions involve 
parents residing outside the United States.293 
Exploring the manner in which immigration law functions as family 
law in the determination of child custody has real consequence. The 
federal government "can only regulate the family when it crafts federal 
laws in ways that purport to embody something other than family law, 
290. See Adler, supra note 23, at 220 (defining family law as "law which regulates one or more 
among a cluster of relationships (whether existing or past), including marriage, non-marital intimate 
partnerships, and parenthood"); Hasday, supra note 24, at 871 (adopting a "serviceable" definition of 
family Jaw as Jaw that "regulates the creation and dissolution of legally recognized family 
relationships, and/or determines the legal rights and responsibilities of family members"). 
291. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, r626 (1992) ('"Immigration 
law,' which is commonly defined as the federal law governing the admission and expulsion of aliens, 
did not exist in this country until 1875. ") (footnotes omitted). 
292. See generally Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1700. 
293. Family Jaw has been described as '"underneath' other legal fields in the sense that its rules 
about roles and duties between men and women, parents and children, families and strangers 
historically and conceptually underlie other rules about employment and commerce, education and 
welfare, and perhaps the governance of the state." Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything 
That Grows:" Towards a History of Family Law, 1985 Wrs. L. REv. 8rg, 819. 
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such as taxation, social security, pensions, or immigration."294 
Immigration laws, therefore, may provide "Congress an unusual 
opportunity to engage in extensive regulation of an area that would 
normally be off limits. "295 For example, immigration law's distinctions 
based on legitimacy regulate families by promoting marriage in a manner 
that would raise objection if attempted directly.296 Similarly, requirements 
for demonstrating a bona fide parent-child relationship under 
immigration law or proving two years of shared residency for acquisition 
of citizenship may shape private choices and behavior otherwise 
unrelated to immigration. 
Masking the regulation of families as immigration law obscures the 
nature of the federal government's engagement with families, creating 
the risk that overreaching extensions of federal power into the lives of 
immigrants and citizens alike escape notice and challenge. Revealing and 
exploring the manner in which immigration law functions as family law 
enhances transparency and serves as a check on possible abuse of federal 
power. Likewise, examining the manner in which family law functions as 
immigration law provides fresh insights regarding the appropriate 
parameters for the consideration of immigration related issues in child 
custody matters. The intersection of family law and immigration law is a 
rich space from which to examine the basic tenets and operation of both. 
A. IMMIGRATION LAw As FAMILY LAw-DETERMINING CHILD CusTODY 
Even on its own terms, it is easy to criticize the treatment of children 
in immigration law. When immigration law is recognized as family law, 
the critique of immigration law's treatment of children intensifies as 
family law provides a fresh perspective from which to consider 
immigration law's treatment of children. 
Castro v. United States, described at the outset of this Article, 
demonstrates several aspects of immigration law as family law. Recall 
that the Border Patrol refused to take a U.S.-citizen child from her father 
as he was repatriated where the mother did not have any state court 
order establishing her right to custody as superior, and the child left the 
294. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 17oo-o7; see also Adler, supra note 23, at 255; 
Hasday, supra note 24, at 875. 
295. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1632. Congress cannot enact laws that have 
"nothing to do with the exclusion of immigrants or the deportation of immigrants, but instead 
regulates the lives of citizens." /d. at 1646-47. Beyond "matters of admission, exclusion, and 
deportation ... the alien inhabits the domain of territorially present persons where different and more 
protective rules against government power apply." Bosniak, supra note 63, at 1097--98. 
296. See Brown, supra note 179, at rso ("[T]o the extent that deterring [extra-marital sexual] 
activity is appropriate public policy, it can hardly be argued that punishing the child who results from 
the illicit activity, rather than the adults who engaged in that activity, is anything but grossly unfair."). 
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country with the father. 297 When litigation arose from this case, the court 
held that the Border Patrol "did not actually make any 'custody 
determination' ... [because it] issued no custody order and made no 
determination that [the child) should remain permanently with either her 
mother or father." 2g8 Yet plainly, the operation of immigration effectively 
functioned to determine the custody of the child for the next three years. 
Moreover, perhaps the father's lack of authorized immigration status was 
the result of his U.S.-citizen daughter's inability to extend an 
immigration benefit to him. Additionally, the arrest in this case was 
prompted by a report from the mother who apparently sought to use the 
blunt instrument of immigration enforcement in the wake of an 
argument between spouses.299 
As a matter of immigration law, this case is hardly remarkable. An 
unauthorized immigrant was removed along with his child, as happens 
everyday. When the immigration law here is viewed as family law, 
however, it appears highly unusual. The custody of a child was effectively 
determined without process and without any consideration of the 
interests of the child. This was possible because the father was amenable 
to removal, a conclusion that immigration law also reached without 
considering the interests of the child. In fact, immigration law shaped this 
situation, from the father's lack of status to the mother's tactics in settling 
a dispute. Whatever decision regarding child custody would have 
resulted from a family law proceeding is unknown because immigration 
law effectively resolved the issue without consideration of any of the 
factors that would have been relevant to a court determining the best 
interests of the child. 
Thinking of immigration law as family law also reveals the extent to 
which it is out of step with deeply held societal values and, in some 
instances, constitutional principles. Certainly, the decision to make 
important regulation of children and families turn on the basis of a 
child's birth in or out of wedlock likely would face immediate 
constitutional challenge without the insulating veneer of Congress's 
plenary power over immigration. This exceptionalism permits 
immigration law to avoid the reconsideration of policies often prompted 
by both successful and unsuccessful constitutional challenges. 
Exposing the ways in which immigration law functions as family law 
brings a new perspective to immigration reform debates. The 
exceptionalism of immigration law may survive as a constitutional 
297. Castro v. United States, No. C-o6-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 
2007). 
298. /d. at *7. 
299. See id. at *2-5. 
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matter, but even constitutionally sound immigration laws may be less 
palatable politically when the manner in which they function as family 
law is the focus. For example, the liberalization of derivation of 
citizenship in the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 was legislation prompted 
largely by concerns over how immigration law operated as family law, 
reaching into white, middle class families with U.S. citizen parents. 
The Child Citizenship Act aimed to "avoid some heartbreaking 
injustices that have sometimes tragically occurred," such as a parent's 
failure to complete paperwork resulting "in their forced separation from 
their children under the summary deportation provisions Congress 
enacted back in 1996."300 Deporting children to countries "with which 
they have no contact, no ability to speak the language, and no family 
known to them is needlessly cruel."301 The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 
"enjoyed broad bipartisan support chiefly because it helped bridge the 
still existing psychological gap between adopted and biological 
children."302 This rhetoric draws not from immigration law motivations 
but rather from family law values. Recasting immigration law as family 
law shifted the debate and created an avenue to see reforms of harsh 
immigration law as valuing family rather than as undermining border 
control. 
Family law and immigration law often have fundamentally 
conflicting values and prioritize contradictory policies, as is apparent in 
immigration law's rejection of the most basic premises of family law 
regarding the treatment of children. Immigration law results in decisions 
about children that are not motivated in the least by consideration of the 
children's best interests. Acknowledging that immigration law functions 
as family law provides an opportunity to incorporate family law values 
and sensibilities into the immigration reform conversation. 
B. FAMILY LAW AS IMMIGRATION LAW 
Family law functions as immigration law in a number of ways and 
exploration of these can provide fresh insights regarding the appropriate 
parameters for the consideration of immigration issues in child custody 
matters. 
First, and most obviously, family law functions as immigration law 
when family courts make child custody decisions that reach across 
borders. These are de facto determinations regarding who may stay in 
the United States and in this context, family courts "have long done what 
300. 146 CoNG. REc. H7774, H7777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt). 
301. /d. at H7778 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson). 
302. VIcroR C. RoMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTs, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND EQuALITY IN 
AMERICA 53 (2005). 
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no immigration court ever could: order U.S. citizens to leave the United 
States."303 In some instances leaving the country with family may be 
appropriate and in others "reunification may not be the only or the 
overriding consideration. "304 The best interests of the child are not the 
motivating factor in immigration determinations, and a family court 
proceeding in this situation is likely the only available forum in which 
children's voices will be heard and their interests will be taken into 
account. 
Second, family law creates and enforces relationships that have great 
relevance in immigration and nationality law and often are determinative 
of immigration and nationality rights. This is true whether the court is 
aware of the immigration implications or oblivious to the impact of its 
determinations on immigration law. The semantic characterization of a 
child custody arrangement may have unanticipated consequences years 
later. Family law requirements for legitimation may serve to open or 
foreclose immigration possibilities. Family law functions as immigration 
regardless of whether it does so intentionally and states cannot claim to 
adequately serve children's interests with laws and policies if they have 
no idea of the impact that these have in such an important dimension of 
many children's lives. 
When family courts do consciously manipulate decisions or 
proceedings to facilitate immigration outcomes, they certainly are 
complicit in the resulting operation of immigration law. Understanding 
the immigration law underlying a request to manipulate a family court 
outcome is critical. In some instances, the family court can serve to 
ameliorate the absence of a child-centered framework in immigration 
law. In others, however, the court must be critically aware that the 
immigration law at issue is motivated by contradictory values and goals. 
Thinking about family law functioning as immigration law prompts 
further hesitancy in considering parents' immigration status in child 
custody decisions. The negative conclusion of immigration law regarding 
a parent's status may be is based on considerations that are anathema to 
family law and are the result of a system explicitly geared to serve some, 
but not all, children. When a parent's unauthorized status is the result of 
an immigration system that fails to take the best interests of children into 
account and denies agency to children, incorporating consideration 
303. Thronson, supra note 28, at I 191. "A key proposition emerges from these cases that children's 
citizenship or immigration status does not override parental decisions to take children out of the 
country. In the broader context of the parent-child relationship and the child's emerging autonomy, 
immigration and citizenship status alone play a limited role in determining whether children remain in 
the United States." /d. at II93· 
304. Bhabha, Not a Sack of Potatoes, supra note 29, at 205. 
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related to and arising from the parent's status would validate not only 
immigration law's conclusion about the parent's status but also the 
premises and system that led to that conclusion. 
Immigration and nationality law may continue to be parent-
centered, gender-biased and discriminatory towards children born out of 
wedlock, but these immigration law throwbacks should never taint state 
judgments to the contrary. An immigration determination based on 
objectionable principles is no less objectionable when laundered through 
a family court. 
CoNCLUSION 
"[F]ew things in the law are as ephemeral as a child custody 
adjudication."305 Children's interests change, as does the world in which 
they live. When immigration issues are involved in or impacted by a child 
custody determination, however, consequences can be profound and 
lasting. While this Article has articulated an argument that consideration 
of immigration issues is occasionally appropriate in child custody 
determinations, it also should serve as a cautionary tale of the 
complexities and potential disasters that can accompany the mixing of 
immigration and family law. 
Understanding the ways in which immigration and nationality law 
devalue children gives further reason to exhibit caution in mixing 
immigration and family law in the determination of child custody. As 
demonstrated, immigration law can function as family law, yet it does so 
in a manner that does not take children's interests into account. If family 
law is to function as immigration law, its own principles and values 
regarding the centrality of the child's interests must not waver. 
305. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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